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FRIEDRICH MAX MUELLER

As a Theorist

of Comparative Religion

G. W. TROMPF

SHAKUNTALA PUBLISHING HOUSE
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TO

MY FATHER

William Henry Trompf (1899-1977)

who showed such great interest in

Max Mueller in the years before he died

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INTRODUCTION

Friedrich Max Mueller (1823-1900), sometime professor of comparative philology at the University of Oxford, has the reputation for being the first European scholar to understand Indian thought and its history. Although he at no time visited Asia, he has earned fame in India for his translations of the *Rig-Veda* and the *Upanishads*, for his editorship of the *Sacred Books of the East* (a mammoth fifty volume collection), and for his solid friendship toward Indian nationalists and intellectuals during the nineteenth century. In more recent years his name has been memorialized in India by the Max Mueller Bhavan (the equivalent to the Goethe Institute in Europe), and by studies of his work which have been run off Indian presses. Nirad Chaudhuri, whom my friend Bhuwan Joshi once described as the Jonathan Swift of India, has not long since produced a detailed personal biography of the man.[1]

Though more than often forgotten, Mueller also has an important place in European, especially English, history. Many young Indians have undertaken studies at Oxford : most probably they missed the chance to visit Mueller's old rooms in All Souls College, but they would have come away learning, not only that Mueller's many writings first introduced the English public to Indian wisdom, but that his work was one of the finest symbols of urbane, liberal Oxonian scholarship during the hey-day of the British Raj.[2] As an academic, Mueller possessed a remarkable ability to command more than one field. He was severally a theorist of religion, a mythologist, philologist and a neo-Kantian philosopher. In the second half of the nineteenth century he figured prominently in English debates which affected all these fields;

he wrangled with Herbert Spencer in the 1870's and 1880's over the origin and growth of religion, he battled with Edward Tylor and the Darwinists in the 1860's over the beginnings of the human language. Almost from the moment he set foot on British soil he became a leading protagonist of the liberal cause in English theology against the current leanings towards Roman Catholicism, and he was an addition to those 'Germanizers', such as Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson, who had been intent on imbuing the English and American public with the rudiments of Teutonic philosophy. With his uncomplicated prose and his concern to write as much for the layman as the scholar, Mueller can be truly ranked alongside those great and eloquent sages, such as Kingsley, the younger Arnold, Spencer and Ruskin, all of whom were to some extent the father-figures of the Victorian fireside.[3]

In Britain and Europe, admittedly, Mueller's prominence was relatively short-lived. His very versability seems to have rendered him blameworthy, for he has often been accused of being over-speculative, of being too sweeping in his judgements, even of riding rough-shod over important details.[4] But for all his faults as a thinker—and his incipiently racist idealization of the Aryans must be included among them—his achievements take on a universal significance in at least one very important respect. As I have asserted more than once, Max Mueller may be deemed the founder of the modern comparative study of religion. He can be said to have fathered a young social science or (as some might prefer) a recognized discipline which is continuing to gain a foothold in the modern, compartmentalized world of learning.[5]

This is not to say that he was the first person to compare the beliefs and practices of different cultures.[6] In the following pages one will find mention of others working on comparable questions, thinkers such as the great, highly influential philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, or the eminent French orientalist Eugène Burnouf. As Mueller was arriving in his adopted homeland of England, moreover, the important young liberal theologian F. D. Maurice was publishing his short sermons on *The Religions of the World*.[7] While Mueller was struggling to collate and translate the manuscripts of the

Rig-Veda, too, B. H. Hodgson was pioneering the scholarly study of Buddhism in the British Museum.[8] Before Mueller had conceived the programme for editing the *Sacred Books of the East,* O. von Boehtlingk and R. Roth had produced their seven-volume *Sanskrit Woeterbuch;*[9] and while scholarly Germans were trying to understand Indian thought, there were Indians attempting to learn the ancient languages of the Old and New Testaments. From among all his precursors and contemporaries, however, we should mark out Max Mueller as the systematic thinker who established the discipline comparative religion in the world of learning. Thus, we may single him out just as we would Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Karl Ritter and other 'founding fathers of social science',[10] while at the same time acknowledging the debt of all these men to the scholarship undertaken before them.

This book concentrates on Mueller as a theorist of comparative religion, yet its scope is that of an intellectual biography. Because religion lay at the heart of his concerns, his ideas on this subject had implications for the whole of his scholarly enterprise. To understand Mueller's theory of religion in both its development and final form, moreover, is to understand him better as a person. I add this life of his mind to already existing historical studies without compunction; his career has not been interpreted this way before and this work is in no sense a conventional biography.[11] In my analysis I also seek to account for the emergence of the modern pursuit of the mind called 'comparative religion', which in our own day has attracted public attention through the books of Mircea Eliade, Joseph Kitagawa, Joachim Wach, Geoffrey Parrinder, Raimundo Panikkar and their like.

I have not made any conscious attempts to emphasize features in Mueller's thought which are of immediate importance for Indian readers. Mueller, after all, was a German professor who spent most of his days researching in an English university. Although I have appended a postscript on his importance both for India and the ongoing study of the world's religions, I have intended to place Mueller fairly and squarely in his European context, to exhibit the unfolding of his 'comparativist' mentality against the background of philosophical and scientific ideas prevalent in his own environment.[12] Perhaps that makes this study somewhat less digestable than it might have been (though the names of Western scholars I mention have been listed, with brief introductions, at the back), but it will at least put Indian readers under no illusions as to the extent of Mueller's preoccupation with southern Asia, and will provide them with a balanced picture of his pursuits and *Weltanschauung*. Besides, there are enough references to Sanskrit, the Aryans and Indian thought in the succeeding pages to make them of clear relevance to India. It is just that I would not have you believe Mueller became more and more divorced from his own culture, or that he managed to escape viewing India through European or Christian eyes. And this work is designed to explain a complex Western mind to interested Indians, not to indianize Mueller nor even to adjudge whether he deserved his respectful Sanskrit epithet *moksha mulara*.

I wish to express sincere thanks to my friend Johannes Voigt for his continual encouragement, to professor Heimo Rau of the Max Mueller Bhavan, and to my wife and family for their constant support. I acknowledge with gratitude the permission granted by the editors of the *Journal of Religious History* to reproduce materials from a previous article of mine, and that granted by Mueller's legatees and the custodians of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, to quote from Mueller's writings, both published and unpublished.

GARRY W. TROMPF

25th June, 1977 The University of Papua New Guinea

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1. N. C. Chaudhuri, *Scholar Extraordinary; the Life of Professor the Rt. Hon. Friedrich Max Mueller, P. C.*, London, 1974. Indian presses have produced the publications of the Max Mueller Bhavan, a biography by Johannes Voigt, and volumes edited by H. Rau and N. Mookerjee (see *infra*).

2. Cf. E. G. W. Bill, *University Reform in Nineteenth Century Oxford*, Oxford, 1973, pp. 134, 211f.; cf. also *The London Times*, 29th Oct., 1900, *obit*.

3. For Mueller's prose see F.P. Stearns, *Modern English Prose Writers*, London, 1897, pp. 305 ff., and on his influence, esp. Mrs. M. Mueller, *The Life and Letters of the Right Honourable Friedrich Max Mueller*, London, 1902, ii, pp. 420ff., cf. also G. F. Barbour, *The Life of Alexander Whyte*, London, 1925 edn., p. 330.

4. For various criticisms, see the opening paragraphs of ch. 3.

5. G. W. Trompf, "Friedrich Max Mueller : Some Preliminary Chips from His German Workshop," in *The Journal of Religious History*, V, 1968, p. 201; "Social Science in Historical Perspective", in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, VII, 1977, p., 130; cf. also J. Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions* (J. M. Kitagawa, ed.), New York, 1958, p. 3. That Mueller also founded the disciplines of comparative philology and comparative mythology is a contention more difficult to defend, and it need not concern us here.

6. The origin of the comparative study of religions must be distinguished from its emergence as a modern scientific discipline. Its origins may be said to go back to such writers as Lord Herbert of Cherbury or even Herodotus!

7. London, 1847.

8. See O. Chadwick, *The Victorian Church*, London, 1970, ii, p. 36, cf. W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson*, London, 1896, *passim*.

9. St. Petersburg, 1853-75, 7 vols.

10. T. Raison (ed.), *The Founding Fathers of Social Science*, Harmondsworth, 1969.

11. Yet cf. R. K. Das Gupta, "Max Mueller as an Indologist", in *Max Mueller Bhavan Publications, Yearbook 1962*, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 87ff.; J. H. Voigt, *F. Max Mueller ; the Man and His Ideas*, Calcutta, 1967, ch. 1.

12. Cf. L. H. Jordan, *Comparative Religion : Its Adjuncts and Allies*, London, 1915, pp. 509ff.

CHAPTER 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUELLER'S RELIGIOUS IDEAS--1823-1847

Mueller was born into a Lutheran household at Dessau, Saxony, in 1823. As his father, a celebrated poet, died five years later, the young Friedrich was introduced to the basic doctrines of Christianity by his mother. It was in fact his mother who did more than any other person to foster in him an over-powering sense of God and a 'simple resignation to God's will.'[1] His Christianity was deepened, not by his early experiences of Lutheran worship (for he reacted against what he called the false *Gottesdienst* of repetitive prayers and dreary sermons among the local congregation),[2] but by the religious instruction at school in Dessau. Of this he wrote later :

> "Thus we grew up from our earliest youth being taught to look upon Christianity as an historical fact, on Christ and his disciples as historical characters, on the Old and New Testaments as real historical books. Though we did not understand as yet the deeper meaning of Christ and his words, we had at least nothing to unlearn in later times.... Our single faith was not shaken by mere questions of criticism... (or the question of the inspiration of the Scriptures, or the Pope)...."[3]

Mueller is reminiscent here, yet it is significant that, late in his life, he attempted to detect in his childhood convictions the firm roots of a faith that "was not shaken by mere questions of criticism".[4] Many of the characteristics peculiar to his Christianity originated in his obscure pre-university days,[5] especially his personal stress on an historical rather than a metaphysical religion. What is important is that, when Mueller left home for the University of Leipzig in 1841, he was harbouring religious views which had a direct bearing on one of the most lively philosophical debates of the nineteenth century.

The University at Leipzig presented an environment already saturated in 'comparative theology'[6] and Mueller entered it with an intense interest in kindred subjects : general literature, history and philosophy. After a short period of government repression in the university, during which he was imprisoned for some months on the charge of liberalism,[7] Mueller returned to his studies and, according to his old *Kollegienbuch*, studied the classics, Sanskrit and ancient Indian thought under Brockhaus. But he also attended lectures in philosophy and its history by three famous German scholars : Christian Weisse, M. W. Drobish and Hermann Lotze.[8]

These philosophers were the most influential independent thinkers of the University, and for the benefit of students and adherents, they organized their own philosophical societies. Mueller soon found philosophical controversy far more attractive than linguistic criticism, and he became a member of these societies.

> "Not being satisfied with what seemed to me a mere chewing of the cud in Greek and Latin, I betook myself to systematic philosophy and even during the first term read more of that than of Plato and Aristotle."[9]

He discovered that the two schools of thought most radically opposed to one another were those of Weisse, a sober Hegelian and an idealist, and Drobisch, a realist who represented the school of Herbart. The conflict between idealists and realists had been of long standing and by the 1840's still appeared to escape resolution,[10] although Hegel's idealist philosophy of religion was being discredited not only by the Herbartians but by dissatisfied idealists as well.[11] Even Weisse's historical conscience revolted against Hegel's *The Philosophy of Religion*,[12] and Lotze, tending more to 'the thesis of Hegelian idealism' than to 'the antithesis of Herbartian realism', was honest enough to attack Hegel on the question of Nature.[13] As most German students were accustomed to follow their professors, Mueller was forced to recognize that the giant of German philosophy was not wholly satisfactory, but from Weisse and Lotze he at least learnt to appreciate the all-embracing qualities of the Hegelian dialectic which made the logic and psychology of Herbart look narrow and pedantic.[14] As a follower of an historical religion, Mueller assumed that a philosopher with an inadequate historical method was better than a logican with no religious mind, and Herbart's agnosticism hardly made up for Hegel's emphasis on *Geistesgeschichte* and his knowledge of the Absolute.[15]

Mueller and German Philosophy

The theological-metaphysical controversy at Leipzig was so complex that Mueller eventually gave up in bewilderment, but his later writings show that moments of doubt and confusion did not prevent him from acquiring a taste for philosophy;[16] he certainly wrestled with the basic issues of the Leipzig philosophical debates, and began to absorb philosophical assumptions, principles and logical devices which best suited his immediate purposes. Above all, it is important that he did read Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion.*[17] In the repetitive, overbearing paragraphs of this huge *chef d'oeuvre,* Mueller's impulsive flirtation with the abstruse propositions of German philosophy, and his avid interest in the literature of ancient India, met. For Hegel, 'the discovery of the common origin of Greek and Sanskrit' was 'the discovery of a new world',[18] and with infectious fervour he had argued that, in the history of natural religion, the religions of India and Persia formed the crucial bridge between the narrow-self-consciousness of magic and fetishism, and 'the consciousness of thought as Universal'.[19] It was above all the completely spiritual Brahman 'Religion of Being-within-itself' which formed the thesis of Hegel's religious dialectic, and which found its antithesis in 'the empirical self-consciousness' of the Hebrews and the Greeks, and its synthesis in Christianity, when 'the spiritual element is developed in a concrete way' and when the relation in which Man 'stands to the One, is a concrete history'.[20] Hegel was the first philosopher to make use of Vedic and Buddhist religion in such an all-embracing treatment of religious consciousness. To some extent, his comparative method was derived from the labours of Lessing, Herder and Schleiermacher, but he was original in his stress upon the historical unfolding of religious *Geist*, and in his suggestion that it was in central Asia that the spiritual power first showed itself 'as a mode of the Universal relative to self-consciousness'.[21] Both these notions never lost their hold on Mueller's religious theory, and although he was to modify them quite radically he never abandoned belief in an historical unfolding of the religious consciousness, as it proceeded towards 'the fullness of time... in its unconscious progress towards Christianity'.[22] And not once did he cease to recognize the crucial role of the Indian religions in this progression.[23]

Christian Weisse was the most noted disciple of Hegel at Leipzig, but Weisse was influential there much more because he represented the Hegelians than because of his own genius. Mueller contracted the Hegelian fever from a rather unoriginal mind, and from a philosopher whose inconsistencies had provoked the severe structures of Schelling earlier on in the century.[24] Despite the weaknesses of his professor, however, young Friedrich very much admired that all-embracing, theologically-oriented historical consciousness of Hegelianism and was drawn to idealism even though he recognized that the dialectic was spurious, and that the arguments of Herbart were weighty. If Weisse had been a more profound exponent of Hegel, it is possible that Mueller would have been the first great neo-Hegelian in England; but the intellectual turmoil of Leipzig made such a state of affairs impossible. By appealing to psychological laws and to the 'acquired experiences' of mind, Drobisch and the Herbartians cast so much doubt on idealist theory that Muller was compelled to inspect the grounds of the 'realists' complaints.[25] From the religious point of view, however, the Herbartians were barren. Whereas Kant, Schelling and Hegel had taken up Leibnitz's Apperception (*Apperzeption*) as the activity of Mind, Johann Herbart had joined the sensationists, interpreting the concept as a kind of mechanical action and reaction (*Druck and Gegendruck*) between soul and environment, and arguing that the true nature of the human psyche, and of religion, could only be inferred from general psychological laws (*allgemeine psychologische Gesetze*).[26] He did not develop any systematic philosophy of religion but simply laid out the psychological groundwork on which religious philosophy and metaphysics might build.

> "All metaphysics arises from experience, and as no experience without metaphysics furnishes a genuine scientific knowledge, so on the other hand, metaphysics is not able to take a single step beyond the limits at which the necessary development of the ideas of experience ends."[27]

On the one hand Hegel was stressing the logic of Mind, and was demonstrating the historical evolution of religious consciousness; on the other hand Herbart put great store by the logic of experience, and by analyzing the psychological foundations of *Apperzeption* he undercut Hegel's *a priori* assumptions.[28] The incompatibility between these two philosophers' positions was more apparent than real, but during the early 'forties at Leipzig appearances were evidently taken far more seriously than reality, for the intellectual conflict was heated. The debate may well have had political implications,[29] but for Mueller it simply posed the problem of unravelling intellectual complexities. He had been confronted by the immortal Hegel, 'a professing Lutheran throughout his life',[30] yet a great theoretician whose gigantic system was breaking at the seams; and he had also encountered Herbart, acute, penetrating and scientific, but a thinker with a most anomalous theological position. Quite naturally Mueller sought something of a *via media*, and he was not alone in his quest. The very man he chose to assist him in his relative confusion had, in the same decade, commenced to reconcile the apparently deep-seated incompatibility between historicism and natural law. That man was Hermann Lotze, by far the greatest intellectual figure at Leipzig in the nineteenth century and destined to take the chair of philosophy at Goettingen in 1844.

When Mueller first met Lotze, personally in 1842, the latter, then aged only 25, had just been made extraordinary professor at Leipzig on the basis of his extremely well-received publications, one of which was the *Metaphisik* of 1841. Mueller's young mentor had thus leapt to fame, heading a philosophical position known as *Ideal-Realismus*, a term denoting 'that school of thought which stands mid-way between the philosophies of Hegel and Herbart'.[31] He reconciled the apparent incompatibility of Hegelian Idealism and Herbartian mechanical laws by contending that, teleologically, the laws of nature ultimately exist in order that the ideal side of the universe (to which the natural aspect was subordinate) should be opened up. "It is a true saying," he stated,

> "that God has ordered all things by measure and number, but what he ordered was not measures and numbers themselves, but that which deserved or required to possess them. It was not a meaningless and inessential reality, whose only purpose could have been to support mathematical relations . . . but the meaning of the world is what comes first. . . . All these laws can be designated by the common name of mathematical mechanics. . . laws which as a matter of fact are everywhere valid, all . . . exist, not on their own authority. . . .They are only the first consequences, which, in the pursuit of its end, the living and active meaning of the world has laid at the foundation of all particular realities as a command embracing them all."[32]

In these tortuous sentences, Lotze consummated his attack on Hegel's idealization of nature, and on those who relegated natural laws to the realm of mere form, and *Panlogismus*;[33] and simultaneously he destroyed the confined atomism of those Realists who appealed to

> "general psychological laws, in accordance with which impressions were produced by facts, reflections followed impressions, and the final expression of figure and comparison were inevitably connected with these preceding conditions."[34]

The philosophy of Lotze provided a readily acceptable solution to Mueller's problems. The latter's faith was left unendangered, safe within Kant's real and universal world of the ideal, the world which was disclosed to Mueller in Lotze's philosophical society, the world which could remain basically unaffected by the explorations of science, a world whose realm was axiological rather than natural.[35] This was a realization which had important consequences for the future. Mueller was to constantly reiterate in his major writings that the *a posteriori* study of nature did not affect his knowledge of God.[36] He did not find the idea of an empirical study of natural phenomena objectionable. Moreover, even if it led to the Darwinian theory of natural selection, and he was never prepared to question the legitimacy of science, except when the study of natural laws was transformed into a mechanical philosophy.[37] But this was only one side to the problem needing solution for the young student at Leipzig. Lotze may have solved the riddle of nature, but what of history? Was history in the realm of nature, or of the ideal? Mueller asked himself: Was human history reducible to 'law' or was it in any sense 'free'?

In his own way, Lotze provided an answer to this question, although his explanations were published in his *Mikrokosmus* thirteen years after Mueller's period at Leipzig university. One can only assume that Mueller heard Lotze's philosophy of history and religion in its incipience and that because of this, the broad historical vision of Hegel retained a prominent place in his understanding of the world. When he offered some small philosophical contributions to university literature in 1942-43, Mueller still tended to feel 'convinced that Hegel could solve all problems' and that although the Prussian appeared to have limited knowledge of Eastern religious thought, his discussion of the growth of religious consciousness was extraordinarily stimulating.[38] The influence of Hegel, however, does not discount the importance of Lotze's philosophy of history or of religion, because Lotze's historical method is derived from both his former teacher Weisse, and from Hegel himself.[39] Lotze was soon to join the Hegelians in constructing a philosophy of history and he was as enthusiastic about the broad scope of Hegel's system as thinkers like Weisse. He was as eager as Hegel to fit the newly explored religions and cultures of the Orient into an historical framework,[40] and to argue that history demonstrated a progress—'an ever-increasing quantum of good'.[41] In his definition of religion, perhaps, Lotze was quite Kantian, stressing the notion of the 'fear of God' (*Furcht Gottes*).[42] Yet Lotze evidently taught both Kant's and especially Hegel's positions as much as his own, mainly because *Ideal-Realismus* depended on a prior knowledge of preceding philosophical traditions. It is significant that Kant, Hegel and Lotze all shared two basic presuppositions concerning history; first, that in contradistinction to the necessitarian realm of nature, history was the realm of freedom;[43] yet second, that history, though the realm of *Freiheit*, was not free in the sense that it was unconditioned, like God, but in the sense that Man's rational consciousness could comprehend, and to some extent, control the orders of nature which impinged upon him.[44] To these philosophers, then, history had two aspects, in Lotze's terms *Geschichte und Naturgeschichte*.[45] On the one hand there was *anēr*, man the conscious mind in search of reality, with a history that could only be construed in terms of the ideal; on the other hand lay *anthrōpos*, the human with his natural history, perhaps illustrated by *allgemeine psychologische Gesetze*, perhaps by comparative philosophy, by racial distinction or even more significantly, by comparative religion. Man and man's history formed a microcosm disclosing the relation between God and this world. Mueller thus found that the fundamental configurations of these three great philosophers of history were the same, that they were trying to redeem man from the exigencies of nature, yet also to observe man historically and empirically. For a young student fascinated by different religions, this 'dualism' was of no mean import. Time and time again, Mueller was to repeat later that the Christian faith had nothing to fear from an attempt to construct a science of religon, and that man's religious consciousness was ultimately free from the discovery of any laws of comparative religions.[46] Mueller could remain a devout Lutheran and yet study religions, as objective historical phenomena, at will.

Mueller's Early Interest in Philology and Mythology

The role of philosophy in the development of Mueller's ideas should not be over-emphasized, for after all he was primarily a theorist of comparative religion and philology. Mueller studied at a university which possessed a recently established chair of Sanskrit, a luxury afforded to the major German universities after Franz Bopp had proved that Sanskrit was an Aryan language,[47] and after Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Schlegel brothers had brought pressure to bear on the Prussian Government.[48] In his study of Sanskrit under

Brockhaus, Mueller turned to 'something that no other philospher knew,'[49] and became captivated with the new world of the *Rig-Veda*. It seemed that this new object of investigation only 'became perfectly intelligible' because, with the philosophies of history propounded by Hegel and Lotze still fresh in his mind, his own understanding of the history of religions was beginning to take on coherent form. For the first time the panorama of religious history was clearly conceived,

> "the step from the visible to the invisible, from the perceived to the conceived, from nature to nature's gods, and from nature's god to a more sublime unseen and spiritual power."[50]

His faith in a divine providential plan, which could be illustrated by the comparative study of religions, soon grew into a fully formulated theory of religion. His convictions were reinforced by those who asserted the need for Sanskrit scholarship, by Friedrich von Schlegel and Wilhelm von Humboldt, both of whom stressed the governance of God in history.[51] He was literally surrounded by renowned *literati* who were assuming an historical progress and contending that the study of human history revealed the marks of its divine destiny. Philosophical terms such as *Zeitgeist*, theological concepts such as Providence, and linguistic phrases such as the Aryan family of languages were all frequently encountered by him in his intensive study. And with his passionate interest in their implications, he desired deeply to see these notions in unity.

In 1844, Mueller had the privilege of hearing Bopp and the aged Schelling in Berlin.[52] With Schelling, Mueller was once again in the presence of one who insisted that God was inextricably involved in the trials and longings of history. Schelling held the strange, yet thought-provoking, belief that Christianity was, and had been, in all religions, that 'a religion that was not in being from the origin of the world and throughout all times, cannot be a true one' and that 'Christianity must therefore have been present in Heathenism.... Only not as Christ,....and not "in his truth".'[53] But this belief had been a well-known article of Schelling's faith; and what Mueller found so stimulating about the Berlin lectures was not so much the repetitions of an old professor, but the penetrating speculations of one who rose supremely above the hindrances of old age to proffer fresh, even revolutionary theories about religion. Schelling, perhaps in his most poetic phase, treated the difficult subject of mythology, and his ideas left a permanent imprint, not only upon Mueller, but upon the whole course of mythological study. In his last textbook Mueller was moved to comment :

> "Ever since Schelling, towards the end of his life, delivered his lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology, mythology has ceased to be mere amusement."[54]

Schelling viewed mythology as a natural, necessary growth, as something 'active and self-moving in accordance with an indwelling law', a product of the collective unconscious.[55] Coupled with this 'epoch making' view was one equally exciting, the idea that if Christianity is, in some sense, in all religions and if mythology can be treated as a 'collective' phenomenon, then the religious development of any race should be considered 'a theogony, the coming-to-be of God as "immanent in his creation".'[56] Schelling was thus presenting a philosophico-theological explanation of race. In Mueller's eye, this too was entirely original :

> "It was Schelling . . . who first asked the question, What makes an *ethnos* ? What is the true origin of a people ? How did human beings become people ? And the answer which he gave, though it sounded startling to me when, in 1845, I listened, at Berlin, to the lectures of the old philosopher, has been confirmed more and more by subsequent researches into the history of language and religion".[57]

Schelling's mythological speculations came as a thunderbolt against Mueller's Hegelian tendencies. Like Lotze, Schelling had questioned Hegel's idealization of nature, the *Panlogismus*, and simply asserted that God affirms himself in nature.[58] In his 1845 lectures, he spoke of a natural mythology and a natural religion in unique terms, concluding that 'natural religion' was not, as it had previously been held, a set of general truths, but real experience, an encounter with the divine.[59] Mythology and religion were thus both 'natural' and 'divine' simultaneously, a complete synthesis of natural forces and divine revelations. For Schelling, to study religious phenomena objectively did not mean a momentary discarding of theology, nor of the philosophy of the absolute religion; and likewise the aged professor acclaimed the hidden merits of non-Christian religions as part and parcel of theology, whereas in Hegel's classifications there was a clear subordination of other religions to that of the Absolute. The dualism of *a priori* history was under fire, and Mueller almost immediately sided with the poetic Schelling, consciously repudiating his former faith in the historicism of Hegel.[60] Mueller saw the simple necessity of 'relying on nothing but historical facts', and on the basis of historical evidence he believed to the end, with Schelling, 'that there has been no entirely new religion since the beginning of the world'.[61]

If Schelling's more consistent historical approach to religion 'opened up many new views' to Mueller,[62] Schelling's treatment of *ethnos* was doubly stimulating. Combined with Bopp's lectures on the Aryan family of languages, Schelling's conclusions forced Mueller to discern a striking parallel between the histories of language and religion.[63] If all languages had basic elements, it was possible that all religions possessed them also. There was, however, a crucial point at which the analogy broke down. If it were permissible to speak of a family of languages (the Aryan family), how feasible was it to speak of a family of religions? Mueller does not appear to have attempted to answer such a question by himself. He felt an urgent need of the opportunity for more intensive research, and for the kind of teacher who would direct him to the relevant facts. It was for this reason that, in mid 1845, he left Germany, though only after establishing an intimate relationship with Schelling, Bopp, Rueckert and even Alexander von Humboldt.[64] He journeyed to Paris.

Mueller in Paris

Baron Christian Bunsen had recommended him to English Scholars, including Archdeacon Hare, on the basis of his translation of *Hitopadesa* from Sanskrit, but negotiations had fallen through, and France rather than England was Mueller's next intellectual home.[65] A brief period of copying and translating with Sanskritist Baron Ferdinand d'Eckstein[66] led to a meeting with the eminent M. Eugène Burnouf, professor in the Collège de France, 'spiritual, amiable, thoroughly French'.[67]

It was not long before Mueller realized that he was in the presence of a brilliant, though extraordinarily polemical student of comparative religions.

> "I am a Brahman, a Buddhist, a Zoroastrian, I hate the Jesuits—that is the sort of man. I am looking forward to his lectures".[68]

It was under Burnouf that Mueller began his laborious task of translating Sanskrit texts of the Vedas whilst he watched 'the ingenious combinations by which that eminent scholar arrived at his discoveries in comparing the myths of the *Rig-veda* and those of the *Avesta*'.[69] It was the Vedas which eventually drove him to England, for he was soon to discover that the most important manuscripts of the Vedas were only to be found in the Bodleian, Oxford.[70] But there was much to be gained at Paris before his eyes turned towards Britain. The Collège de France was alive with students of great potentiality. Ernst Renan was there,[71] as were Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Abbé Bardelli and Augustin Thierry, who together with Renan and Burnouf himself, continued for many years to be among Mueller's closest friends.[72] And in Paris there were as many new ideas as there were friends.

There Mueller began to obtain answers to that question which Schelling had left unanswered; how justifiable was it to speak of a family of religions? Eckstein and Burnouf—each one another's admirers—were both neo-Catholics poring through aged texts in search of a primitive revelation, a Catholicism long anterior to the contemporary Catholicism they had come to question.[73] Eckstein's conclusions were somewhat over-imaginative; he believed he could recover not just 'some vague conception of deity' in the distant past,

> "but a positive doctrine shored up with rites, cults, mysteries and dogmas, disfigured perhaps by gross idolatry, but recognizable as forming the basis of Christ's redemptive mission in the world."[74]

As Mueller 'saw a good deal of Baron d'Eckstein',[75] and watched Burnouf 'open up' India as 'a page in the origins of mankind, and in the history of the human spirit',[76] he could not but be affected by their concentrated efforts to establish the primordial centre of mankind's religion. Although Mueller's subsequent views are quite distinguishable from those held by these two scholars, he clearly came to share Burnouf's conviction that it was India which provided the vital clue to *l'histoire de l'esprit humain.*

Burnouf, to Mueller 'one of the greatest scholars that France ever produced', was absorbed by the Aryan contribution to civilization.[77] In deciphering the language of the *Zend-Avesta,* he not only revealed that it was an Indo-European speech, but also that there was an 'ancient state of religion and tradition common to the Aryans' before 'the schism' which eventually produced Zend and Sanskrit.[78] With such new insights, Lotze's vague foreshadowings of the theory of the Aryan race became a vital doctrine for interpreting the whole history of religion.[79] For Mueller both Indo-European languages and religions came to be treated in terms of the 'Aryan family', in terms of a unique socio-religious bond which formed the crucible of history. It is possible that Lotze sowed the first seeds of Aryan 'racialism' in Mueller's mind, but Burnouf gave it firm root.

Full-blown Aryanism, admittedly, could not be maintained without detriment to Judaism. Young Émile Burnouf, for example, a relative of Eugène's, later came to argue that the Semites, an inferior race 'between the Aryans and the yellow peoples', 'possessed no faculty for abstract thought',[80] and that the supremacy of Christianity lay in the superiority of its metaphysical speculation, in its conception of God as an 'eternal being' rather than an 'oriental king'.[81] Renan, too (who was Eugène's student even through the 1848 Revolution), was to question the very Jewishness of Christ in the pages of his renowned *Vie de Jésus.*[82] Eugène himself, though, did not go as far as some of those influenced by him, and the mildness of his own Aryanism is comparable to the moderate position held by Mueller from this time on. It was certainly in Paris that Mueller learnt to appreciate the immense importance of 'the Alexandrian philosophy' of the *Logos,* which was recognizably an 'exclusively Aryan' achievement.[83] Hegel had expounded upon the *Logos* in connection with the rationality of the divine mind, Schelling upon it in the more theological parts of his work, and now Burnouf had treated it, this time with more a racial bias which did not fail to leave its imprint upon Mueller's intellect, and which gave additional cohesion to the young scholar's philosophy of religion.[84] Mueller now ascribed to the concept of *Logos* a far greater significance than he had done hitherto, and although he denied Alexandrian Gnosticism, he strongly sympathized 'with the objects which in the beginning Alexandrian Gnosticism and Neoplatonism had in view', and considered that the preface to John's Gospel was the most crucial portion of the Bible.[85] The *Logos* became, for Mueller, the supreme intellectual achievement of the ancient world because it gave theological meaning to the Aryan search for truth, and yet at the same time it represented the crystallization of the final religion, his own beloved faith.[86]

Eugène Burnouf, 'the nestor of oriental scholarship,' was thus Mueller's last great mentor,[87] and the last renowned scholar to mould the mind of one still young enough to be impressionable, and still undogmatic enough to be teachable. Burnouf was at the end of a long line of distinguished and influental counsellors. Hegel had effectively married theology with the history and philosophy of religions; Lotze by contrast had suggested how the history of religions could be divorced from theology and investigated scientifically without danger to the Christian faith. Schelling had advocated a kind of remarriage; the history of religions was the natural process which veiled the theosophical revelation of divine Providence. But Mueller's path from Hegel to Schelling was hampered by a growing awareness that great philosophers were rarely competent as linguists, and were sadly inadequate as students of eastern religion. It was not until he heard Schelling that German religious theories appeared to have had any real relevance to the Indo-European linguistic discoveries of Brockhaus and Bopp. But it was Eugene Burnouf who consummated his constant search 'for some great work',[88] suggesting that the histories of language and religion could be brought together into the one huge complex of 'Aryanism'. It was at Paris where Mueller first conceived God's Providence to be manifested racially, with the Aryan household truly reflecting God's plan. In Paris, Mueller found a direct and vital relationship between comparative philology and the philosophy of religion, and it turned him in the direction of the Vedas, the first great religious and literary achievement of the Aryans, and the first significant disclosure of the divine purpose. Mueller was never an avowed disciple of Burnouf and he later declared, in metaphorical language, that his great teacher had 'left no son and no successor';[89] but the bold combination of Aryan history and divine Providence, which owed so much to Mueller's short-lived stay in Paris, was to form the most central basis of the young German's religious theory.

In 1847, Mueller dropped all, and began to devote his life to the Vedas,

> "A work which had never before been published in India or in Europe, that occupied in the history of Sanskrit literature the same position which the Old Testament occupies in the history of the Jews, the New Testament in the history of modern Europe and the Koran in the history of Mohammedanism."[90]

He was aware of but one predecessor, Friedrich Rosen, a German who had died whilst studying the Vedic manuscripts in England,[91] and it was to England that Mueller was determined to journey. Beginning his work of translation from texts in the possession of Burnouf, and of the Royal Library in Paris, he soon acquired enough money to cross the channel, to be greeted 'like a son' in July, 1847, by Baron Christian Bunsen, a reputable scholar, Prussian Ambassador to England, and one of London's most genial hosts.[92] Gaining immediate employment with the East India Company (which possessed Vedic manuscripts in Leadenhall Street), Mueller found that it was not long before he was gazing at the future centre of his immense scholarship, 'the most interesting and beautiful city in Europe'[93]—Oxford.

Abbreviations used *in references below* for Mueller's works are as follows :

Auld = *Auld Lang Syne*, Ser. 1, London, 1898.

AR = *Anthropological Religion* (Gifford Lectures, 1891), London, 1892 edn.

AutoFrag = *My Autobiography; a Fragment*, London, 1901.

Chips = *Chips from a German Workshop*, London, 1880 edn., 4 vols.

Contributions = *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, London, 1897, 2 vols.

HL = *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religions of India* (Hibbert Lectures, 1878), London, 1880.

Introduction = *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, London, 1882 edn.

NR = *Natural Religion* (Gifford Lectures, 1889), London, 1898 edn.

PR = *Physical Religion* (Gifford Lectures, 1890), London, 1898 edn.

PsR = *Theosophy, or Psychological Religion* (Gifford Lectures, 1892), London, 1893.

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SBE = *Sacred Books of the East* (ed. Mueller), London, 1879ff.
SE = *Selected Essays on Language, Mythology and Religion*, London, 1881; 2 vols.
SL = *Lectures on the Science of Language*, London, 1873 (1st and 2nd Ser.), 2 vols.
ST = *The Science of Thought*, London, 1887.
LLM = Mrs. M. Mueller, *The Life and Letters of Friedrich Max Mueller*, London, 1902, 2 vols.
Other titles remain unabbreviated.

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1. *LLM*, i, p. 356 (letter to his mother, Oct. 9, 1868).

2. Mueller, *AutoFrag.*, p. 59.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

4. Mueller was fully aware of the memory difficulties involved in the study of his own 'parental and atavistic characteristics' and his childhood development. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-38.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 26 and 43 for some pointers.

6. This must be distinguished from comparative religion; it involved the comparison of doctrines only, and did not necessarily entail non-Christian creeds.

7. See *Auld*, pp. 52-54, and for background to the Leipzig riots in the early 'forties, F. Meinecke, 'Liberalism and Nationality in Germany and Austria, 1840-48,' in *Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge, 1910, xi, p. 59.

8. See *AutoFrag*, pp. 120, 121 Neander and the Kantian Hartenstein are also mentioned in his *Kollegienbuch*.

9. *AutoFrag*, p. 126.

10. Idealists and realists were talking at cross purposes; while the former (beginning from Kant) were talking about the forms of mind, Herbartian realists were discussing the acquired characteristics of mind, so that the questions being asked were different and not necessarily in opposition, cf. W. T. Harris, Preface and Introduction to J. Herbart's *A Textbook of Psychology* (trans. M. K. Smith), New York, 1897, pp. xiv-xv.

11. See *AutoFrag*, pp. 130ff. For other reactions against the Hegelian system see esp. K. Loewith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche* (trans. D. E. Green), Garden City, 1967, pp. 50ff.

12. *AutoFrag*, pp. 131, 132. I used the translation and edition of G. W. F. Hegel's *Lectures in the Philosophy of Religion* by E. Speirs and B. Sanderson, London, 1895, 3 vols. (hereafter *LPR*).

13. For the quotations, C. E. von Hartmann, *Lotze's Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 35, cf. E. E. Thomas, *Lotze's Theory of Reality*, London, 1921, p. xxvi. For Lotze on Hegel's idea of nature, see *AutoFrag*, p. 133.

14. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

15. Herbart believed in the immortality of the soul (cf. his *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, 1834, Hamburg, 1886 edn., sect. 246), but he was quite agnostic about the arrangements of Providence (*Ibid.*, sects. 246, 251, 252). For Hegel on the Absolute, see esp. *Early Theological Writings* (trans. and ed. R. Knox), Chicago, 1948, pp. 264-66 on *Objekt* and *Gegenstand*, cf. also G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, Oxford, 1950, pp. 297, 298.

16. See *AutoFrag.*, p. 134 (and on his later writings, *infra*).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

18. Mueller's *SE*, i, p. 449, cf. I. Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, London, 1889, p. 1. For Hegel on Bopp, see *LPR*, ii, esp. p. 38.

19. *Ibid.*, ii, p. 38. For background in Herder and Goethe, see H. Rau, Foreword to N. Mookerjee (ed.), *I Point to India*; *Selected Writings of Max Mueller (1823 to 1900)*, Bombay, 1975 edn., pp. v-vi; and on India as the 'longed for land' among the young German romanticists, see H. Rau, 'Friedrich Max Mueller—the Man and His Life,' in H. Rau (ed.), *F. Max Mueller; What He Can Teach Us*, Bombay, 1974, p. 3.

20. For the three quotations, *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 48, 289, iii, p. 143. J. N. Findlay put down Hegel's arguments in the following simple form : 'Hegel now follows the historical development of religion through the various allegedly necessary stages, beginning with a magical, purely natural state of religion, passing through the religions of pantheistic substantiality (the Chinese religion of measure, the Indian religion of fantasy and the Buddhist religion of inferiority), through the transitional religions of light (Zoroastrianism), of suffering (the Syriac), and of the riddle (Egyptian), to the religions of individual spirituality, where Hegel distinguishes the religion of sublimity (Judaism), of beauty (Greek religion) and of purposiveness (Roman religion). Finally, as in *The Phenomenology*, he passes on to the Absolute or Revealed Religion that for the first time explicitly realizes the notion of religion, that of being merely the self-revelation or self-communication of Absolute Spirit'. (*Hegel*; *A Re-examination*, London, 1958, p. 344).

21. *LPR*, i, pp. 297, 298, and see p. 327 on the first signs of metaphysical thought.

22. *Chips*, i, pp. xx, cf. xxxii-xvii, and *Introduction*, pp. 28, 29, 87 on Hegel, and p. 88 for an historical example.

23. See Taylor, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 2-5.

24. See F. W. J. von Schelling, 'Rueckert und Weisse, oder die philosophie zur des es keines Denkens und Wissens bedraf' (1802), in *Saemmtliche Werke*, Stuttgart, 1859, Abt. 1, v, pp. 78ff., esp. 95,105. He accused Weisse of making idealism practical and Rueckert of making realism *a priori*. It is of interest that Weisse was attracted by aspects of Kant's thought, for which he received later praise from Mueller in 'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' (1881), in *Last Essays*, London, 1901, p. 220.

25. By attending Drobrisch's society, see *AutoFrag*, p. 126.

26. For Leibnizt's *Apperzeption*, see his *Philosophical Papers and Letters* (ed. L. E. Loemaker), Chicago, 1956, i, esp. p. 39, cf. 251, 252, 552, ii, 1036, 1046, etc.), and for the way Herbart approached it, see Harris, *loc. cit.*, p. xvi. A very important book linking Herbart to Leibnitz is J. Davidson's *A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibnitz*, Edinburgh, 1906, cf. also Herbart's own *Lehrbuch*, *op. cit.*, sect. 246. For sound analytical work on Leibnitz's view of spirits as bare monads which are 'defined by self-consciousness or apperception, by the knowledge of God and eternal truths, and by the possession of what is called reason', see B. Russell, *A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Leibnitz*, London, 1951 edn., p. 141.

27. Herbart, *op. cit.*, sect. 252.

28. Hegel *did* have a logic, although Mueller tended to forget this (cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic* (trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers), London, 1929, 2 vols.). On Herbart's logic, Drobrisch's *Empirische Psychologie nach naturwissenschaftlicher Methode*, Leipzig, 1842, was particularly important.

29. In the 'forties Herbart was considered liberal and radical beside the conservative Hegel; Loewith, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-49, 55, cf. K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, London, 1962 edn., ii, pp. 56f., 72.

30. Mure, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

31. T. M. Lindsay, 'Hermann Lotze,' in *Mind*, I, 1876, p. 363 contains a short biographical account of the man who was, 'by universal consent, the most popular philosophical teacher that Germany' possessed in the 'forties and 'fifties ; cf. p. 364 on *Ideal-Realismus*. According to *AutoFrag*, p. 137 Mueller began to study Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*—the most important book for the development of his own more theoretical philosophical views—in Lotze's society. Lotze's well received publications at this time were (what became) pt. 2 of his *System der Philosophie* : *Metaphisik, drei Bucher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie*, Leipzig, (later edn. 1879), and a medical textbook, *Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften*, Leipzig, 1842.

32. *Metaphisik*, ii, pp. 603, 604.

33. For a discussion of Lotze's approach to Hegel's idealization of nature, see H. Jones, *The Philosophy of Lotze; the Thought*, Glasgow, 1895, pp. 8, 9.

34. Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*; *Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit*, Goettingen, 1856-64 (German text and Eng. trans. by E. Hamilton and C. Jones), Edinburgh, 1888, bk. VII, ch. iii, sect. 6, pp. 208, 209.

35. Mueller always retained this sharp separation in his epistemology. See 'Why I am not an Agnostic', in *The Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, 1894, p. 894.

36. Eg., *ibid.*, p. 895.

37. See *LLM*, i, p. 442 (letter to Gladstone, 23rd Dec. 1872).

38. *AutoFrag*, p. 137, *NR*, p. 17, *SE*, ii, pp. 129, 130.

39. Weisse was professor at Leipzig while Lotze was studying there. For some important comments, see Lindsay, *loc. cit.*, p. 363.

40. See *Mikrokosmus*, VI, v, 3, pp. 113, 114, cf. VII, ii and v.

41. *Ibid.*, VII, ii, 4, p. 172.

42. See Mueller's account of Lotze's definition of religion in *NR*, p. 64. For Kant, see *Lectures on Ethics* (trans. L. Infield), New York, 1963 edn., pp. 95-104.

43. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (trans. J. Sibree), New York, 1956 edn., pp. 40-42 ; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. Mueller), London, 1881, pp. 468-87; Lotze, *op-cit.*, VII, i, 3, p. 79.

44. For discussion of this aspect in Kant, see Mueller, *Chips*, iv, p. 442; E. Caird, *Critical Exposition of Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, ii, p. 500; and in Lotze, see Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 374. For Hegel, see his *Philosophy of History*, op.cit., p. 341.

45. From the sub-title of *Mikroskosmus*. For another approach to material necessity and the realm of freedom in German idealist philosophy, see G. V. Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895), (trans. A. Rothestein), New York, 1972, pp. 101-09.

46. Lotze lectured to Mueller in 1841 on 'anthropology' and probably introduced the distinction then. *AutoFrag*, p. 120.

47. F. Bopp, *Comparative Grammar of the Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Gothic, German and Slavonic Languages* (trans. E. B. Eastwick), London, 1850-56, 3 vols.

48. Alexander von Humboldt was also partly involved. The Humboldts tried to put Bopp in the Sanskrit chair at Wuerzburg but failed. August Wilhelm Schlegel held the first Sanskrit professorship in a German university.

49. *AutoFrag*, p. 142.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 146.

51. Mueller read Schlegel's *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, Vienna, 1808, and became enthusiastic about a real intellectual relationship between Europe and India (see *Biographical Essays*, London, 1884, p. 318). For W. von Humboldt's and Schlegel's philosophies generally, see the former's 'Ueber Religion,' in *Werke*, Darmstadt, 1960 edn., i, pp. 1ff., and *Letters to Varnhagen von Ense, 1827-58* (Eng. trans.), London, 1860, sv. 10th May, 1837, and the latter's *Philosophy of History* (trans. J. B. Robertson), London, 1846, *passim*.

52. *AutoFrag*, p. 122, *NR*, p. 17.

53. In *Werke*, *op. cit.*,4, iv, p. 77.

54. Mueller's *Contributions*, i, p. 44.

55. Quoting E. Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, London, 1950, p. 297. E. L. Allen, in his *Christianity among the Religions*, London, 1960, p. 68, speaks of this conception as 'epoch making'.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

57. *Introduction*, p. 84.

58. A. G. Widgery, 'Classical German Idealism, the Philosophy of Schopenhauer and Neo-Kantianism,' in V. Ferm (ed.), *History of Philosophical Systems*, Iowa, 1958, pp. 303f.

59. Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 67ff.

60. For his attacks on Hegel, see *SE*, i, p. 3, ii, pp. 129f.; *NR*, pp. 69f., 220, 264; *Introduction*, p. 147 (although Schelling is included in this assault); *Chips*, i, p. ix, cf. *PsR*, p. 44.

61. See 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 895 for the first quotation, and *Chips*, i, p. x for the second.

62. *NR*, p. 17.

63. See *Chips*, i, pp. x, xix, xxii, xxxviii for the language-religion analogy.

64. *LLM*, i, p. 30; *AutoFrag*, p. viii; F. Rueckert, 'Erinnerungen eines juengeren Freundes', in *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1873, supp. 39, 40, 44. Cf. also Rau, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

65. For the recommendation and translation, see *infra*. Mueller also translated some of the *Upanishads* for Schelling, and also discussed them with Schopenhauer at Frankfurt; *NR*, pp. 17-20.

66. *Auld*, pp. 61f.

67. *LLM*, i, p. 34. Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852) must be distinguished from Émile Burnouf (1821-1907), who was also an Orientalist at Paris and a relative of the former scholar. In a previous article I have treated Émile as Mueller's teacher ('Friedrich Max Mueller; some preliminary chips from his German Workshop,' in *The Journal of Religious History*, V, 1966, pp. 211-13, cf. H. Rau, *Der verehrte Pandit Max Mueller*, Heidelberg, 1966, p. 294), thus commiting the same mistake made century ago by Matthew Arnold; cf. *Auld*, p. 118.

68. *LLM*, i, p. 34.

69. *Contributions*, i, p. 2 for the quotation, cf. *LLM*, i, pp. 35ff. on the Vedas.

70. Cf. *ibid.*, i, pp. 53, 60; *SE*, ii, p. 115.

71. See Renan ('Eugène Burnouf, sur la vue d'un essai bien imparfait que je présentiai au concourse du prix Volney, en 1847, m'adopta comme son élève'). *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, Paris, 1883, p. 370, cf. D. G. Charlton *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*, London, 1963, p. 57, n. 69.

72. On St. Hilaire, Bardelli and also Goldstuecker, see *LLM*, i, pp. 34, 64. On Thierry,see Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

73. See K. R. Stunkel, 'India and the Idea of a Primitive Revelation in French Neo-Catholic Thought,' in *The Journal of Religious History*, VIII, 1975, pp. 230f. with the relevant quotation from Eckstein, *Le Catholique*, III, 1826, pp. 171f.

74. Stunkel, *loc. cit.*, p. 231. Cf. also Eckstein, 'De l'action morale et philosophique de l'Europe sur l'Asie et de l'Asie sur l'Europe tant dans le présent que dans l'avenir', in *Le Catholique*, IX, 1828, pp. 341f., and for the subsequent importance of the idea of a primary revelation for Mueller, see ch. 3 *infra*.

75. See, *LLM*, i, p. 38, cf. 253.

76. Burnouf's inaugural lecture quoted in R. Schwab, *La Renaissance orientale*, Paris, 1951, p. 313.

77. Cf. *SL*, i, p. 233.

78. *Ibid.*, ii, p. 643.

79. See Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*, *op. cit.*, VII, v, 1, pp. 248ff.

80. Émile Burnouf, *The Science of Religions* (trans. J. Liebe), London, 1888, pp. 190f. (*La Science de la religion* was first published serially in *Revue des deux mondes*, 1864-1869), and F. E. Faverty, *Matthew Arnold, the Ethnologist*, Evanston, 1951, p. 171.

81. Burnouf, *op. cit.*, pp. 78f.

82. See Paris, 1883 edn., esp. p.2. On Renan's student days, H. W. Wardman, *Ernest Renan; a critical biography*, London, 1964, pp. 26ff.

83. See Burnouf, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

84. See Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257f., and on Schelling, Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 69f.

85. Quoting from 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 892, cf. p. 895 on the importance of John.

86. See esp. *Chips*, i, pp. xxi-xxx.

87. Quoting F. P. Stearns, *Modern English Prose Writers*, London, 1897, p. 290.

88. *SE*, ii, p. 114.

89. *Introduction*, p. 28.

90. *SE*, ii, p. 114.

91. *Ibid.*

92. Quoting *LLM*, i, p. 52, cf. p. 59. For the MSS., see *ibid.*, p. 143, cf. *SE*, ii, p. 115, and for Mueller's finances, *LLM*, i, p. 47. Bunsen's original re-

commendation had been made in 1844, cf. *ibid.*, i, pp. 28ff.; F. (Baroness) Bunsen, *Memoirs of Baron Bunsen*, London, 1869, ii, p. 49, and note also Bodleian Library MSS (Mueller's letters, Dep. d. 163,) sv. 29th and 30th Jan., 1845. N. C. Chaudhuri discusses Bunsen's offer of help, in *Scholar Extraordinary; the Life of Professor the Rt. Hon. Friedrich Max Mueller, PC.*, London, 1974, pp. 56f.

93. Quoting *LLM*, i, p. 60 (Mueller to his mother, 12th Feb., 1847), and for the East India Company, see *ibid.*, i, pp. 56-60, *SE*, ii, p. 115.

CHAPTER 2

VEDAS, ARYANS AND THE RELIGION OF CHRIST—1848-1867

One morning during February, 1849, an Oxford undergraduate by the name of Blomfield attended a theological lecture delivered by the Senior Tutor of Exeter College, Dr. William Sewell. The lecturer dilated to his students upon a little book, the recent appearance of which had startled the more conservative of the Oxford academics.

> "He warned the young men against the book, and asked whether anybody had read it. One of the undergraduates (Blomfield) produced a copy which belonged to him. Dr. Sewell continued his sermonette, and warming with his subject, he finished by throwing the book which did not belong to him, into the fire, at the same time stirring the coals to make them burn. Of what follows there are two versions. Dr. Sewell, when he had finished, asked the class, 'Now what have I done?' 'You have burned my copy,' the owner of the book said in a sad voice, 'and I shall have to buy a new one.' The other version of the reply was, 'you have stirred the fire, Sir'."[1]

This was the renowned little book, *The Nemesis of Faith* by the fine young English scholar, James Anthony Froude, Fellow of Exeter College.[2] The book was a type of novel, relating in letter form the story of the spiritual adversities of the Rev. Markham Sutherland. On entering the ministry with a measure of misgiving, Sutherland became increasingly disillusioned with the narrowness and shallowness of the Anglican Church, and almost spiritually deranged by outdated sermons, the idolatry of the Bible, obscure metaphysics and contraditions in Christian teaching.[3] In Sutherland, Froude appears to have created a fictitious self-portrait to convey his own feelings about the inadequacies of the Church.[4] The biting criticisms of *The Nemesis* enraged the orthodox, but its very unpopularity made it sell. Unwittingly Sewell had given the book an excellent advertisement.[5]

The Nemesis of Faith is not only important because it was one of those rare specimens of heterodoxy which emerged from the bastion of English conservatism, nor simply because it represents the fruits of Froude's sudden reaction against the supporters of John Henry Newman,[6] but because quite a number of Froude's arguments rested on an appeal to religious beliefs and practices outside the Christian pale. In speaking of bibliolatry, for example, he asserted (in Sutherland's letters):

> "The Mahometans say their Koran was written by God. The Hindoos say the Vedas were; we say the Bible was, and we are but interested witnesses in deciding absolutely and exclusively for ourselves."[7]

In discussing the inevitable success of the Christian message, Sutherland is made to conclude that Christianity's greatness lies in its combination of Judaistic sacrificial theory, the evil spirit doctrine of the Parsis, Zoroaster's teaching of a future state, Plato's speculations on the spirit and the Trinity, and 'lastly, the Hindoo doctrine of the incarnation. . . which interpenetrates' the other religions 'with an awful majesty which singly they had not known.'[8]

How Froude should come to voice such opinions is a question worth considering. In early 1842, following his Irish tour, Froude found himself a little less under the influence of the Tractarians,[9] and was suddenly confronted with the works of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson. He found himself

> "addressed by thinkers of a power and earnestness at least equal to the most brilliant of the Churchmen, with this difference : that I was no longer referred to books and distant centuries but to present facts and the world in which I lived and breathed."[10]

The Germanizers had their natural effect. Froude turned to Goethe, for 'Goethe had been Carlyle's teacher',[11] and finally to other great masterpieces of German literature.

> "It was to the Germans...that I turned with largest hope and fullest enjoyment. I studied Lessing and Schiller, and Goethe more than all. I avoided the theologians."[12]

One can assume that Froude's interest in the field of comparative religions had its origins in his preference for the Germanizing 'prophets' as against the English 'priests'.[13] In Lessing (and also Schleiermacher) he discovered a rationality and an objectivity far more satisfying than that which he uncovered in Newman's lectures on natural religion, because with both Germans 'all positive and revealed religions are equally true'.[14] It was Lessing and Schleiermacher who first presented to him a broad vista of mankind's experiences. It was their faith in reason that led Froude to reject Newman's assumption that the intellect was 'naturally sceptical', and to affirm that, in the course of time, the intellect of man inevitably effected a victory for truth. He believed that, by dint of historical circumstance,

> "Christianity grew because the soil was ready prepared, because the intellect 'had had a career', and had broken the back of superstition."[15]

When it came to a fuller examination of other religions, however, Lessing and Schleiermacher were not Froude's only sources of information. In April, 1848, the year in which Froude was preparing *The Nemesis of Faith*, he met Emerson, and intimately conversed with one of the men who 'was in part responsible for' his 'present state of mind'. Emerson solemnly recommended him to study the Vedas.[16] Yet Froude was no Sanskrit scholar, and in addition, German editions of the Indian scriptures were scarce, and English translations virtually non-existent.[17] How opportune then, that Friedrich Max Mueller, a brilliant young scholar from Leipzig, should arrive in Oxford in May with the express purpose of expounding and translating the very texts for which Froude so earnestly yearned!

Mueller and the Liberal Anglicans of Oxford

Exactly when Mueller first met Froude is difficult to decide; Froude first mentions him in a long letter to the poet Arthur Hugh Clough on the 15th July 1848, and in such a way as to imply that his friendship with Mueller was already well established.[18] Certainly Mueller had become intimate with Froude before the publication of *The Nemesis of Faith* in the following year, because he described how he assisted Froude to name his volume before it was forwarded to the publishers.[19] Mueller probably contributed even more towards Froude's novel by clarifying some of the obscurities in German philosophy, and in discussing the insights of non-Christian religions; his association with Froude best explains the freshness and acuteness with which the latter drew comparisons between Christianity and other faiths.[20] Mueller's concern for his friend's activities doubtless softened the unavoidable uneasiness of living in a strange land. The young Oxonian responded not only by seeking his company and his enlightened suggestions, but also by introducing him to a friendly group of eminent Englishmen. Among the most significant were Arthur Stanley and Benjamin Jowett (both of whom were popular tutors at Oxford in 1848), the two brilliant young poets Arthur Hugh Clough and Matthew Arnold, and the famed 'Christian socialist', Charles Kingsley.[21] Significantly enough, when Sewell impugned *The Nemesis*, these associates joined Mueller in his justification of Froude. At such a time of crisis 'Mueller was one of the few people in Oxford who stood by Froude and took a deep and active interest in his future plans of life';[22] amongst the few were Stanley, who 'never said an unkind word against him',[23] Clough, who considered *The Nemesis* an important book containing,

> "a good deal of what I imagine pervades the young world in general",[24]

young Arnold, who, as Bonnerot expressed it, had 'a certain affinity' with the yearning of Froude's novel,[25] and Kingsley, who at considerable cost, 'gave him friendship, sympathy, and moral support'.[26] Froude had other supporters; F. T. Palgrave, who became his 'great disciple' (and a welcome friend to Mueller)[27] and likewise Baron Bunsen, who, writing about *The Nemesis* from London in April, 1849, said that he could not 'describe the power of attraction exercised upon me by this deep-searching, noble spirit'.[28]

All these men did not rally merely because of Froude's misfortunes. They had adversities enough of their own, and all of them had already begun to feel the crushing blows of *odium theologicum*.[29] Almost all of them were in the theological sense, liberal, and apart from Mueller and Bunsen, Anglican.[30] Many of them, like Froude, were devoted to Carlyle, attracted by the Germanizers and suspicious of the Tractarian authoritarianism which had gained such a wide following in the first half of the nineteenth century.[31] The tide of Oxford's conservatism had commenced to break in upon them, determined as it was to expose the children of the Broad Church, and to overcome them through the powerful force of Newman's logic.[32] It is for this reason that most of Mueller's new friends fell readily into an identifiable group, bearing the brunt of the same kind of theological criticism, and drawn together by common ideals and by religious agreement.

The original *esprit de corps* of this group is difficult to discern clearly, but the teaching which defined their common bond in the third quarter of the century is best reflected in the phrase 'The Religion of Christ'. Froude had used this idea in his *Nemesis*, distinguishing it from 'the Christian religion', and speaking of it as 'the poor man's gospel, the message of forgiveness, of reconciliation, of love'.[33] Kingsley and Stanley (although the former never pretended to be as learned a theologian as the future Dean of Westminster) both agreed wholeheartedly with this distinction, stressing that 'the one idea of Christianity was practical Christianity honesty, purity and love'.[34] For Kingsley 'Christ was the true friend of the poor, the Ideal Man'; for Stanley, Christ and not the Church was 'the very corner-stone of Christianity'.[35] It was this same attitude of mind which led Jowett to write :

> "I show you a more excellent way—not in the scriptures, nor in the Church, nor in a system of doctrines, nor in miracles, does Christianity consist, though some of these may be its necessary accompaniments and instruments, but in the life and teaching of Christ."[36]

Arnold held like views, and in discussing the metaphysical struggles behind the formulation of the Athanasian Creed, he asserted that

> "the real essence of Scripture is a much simple matter...for the New Testament, Follow Jesus !...Religion has been

> made to stand on its apex instead of its base; righteousness is supported on ecclesiastical dogma, instead of ecclesiastical dogma being supported on righteousness."[37]

Even Clough, before he had become an agnostic in the 1860's, shared similar ideas. When arguing with the Tractarians in 1859, he had put the Articles of Religion aside and focussed his whole attention on gospel history, expecting to discover the true 'Christian ideal'.[38] Palgrave endorsed Christ's centrality, and Bunsen, writing more from an historical point of view, concluded his second volume of *God in History* with an emphasis on the historical 'Jesus of Nazareth' who 'bound together the old world and the new'.[39] These feelings amounted to a conscious determination to rebut the apparent rigidity of the Newmanite catechizers. Their relationships were first developed in Oxford in the late 'forties, where of all places in England a sense of intellectual ferment and immediacy were so marked. Yet even when many of them had left Oxford, time did not destroy their associations, nor their common rallying-point. Perhaps Clough was the one exception, but the others continued their intimacies, visiting and corresponding with one another, dedicating their books to each other, praising the same social virtues and criticizing the same social evils. However, one could not speak of them as an organization or a movement; at the most, the historians can only discuss them in terms of their close contact, their common interests and ideals.[40]

Johann von Herder seems to have been the first to use the concept of the 'religion of Christ' as the basis of a philosophy of religion, but it is unlikely that its usage amongst 'the liberal spirits' of Oxford had its source in German theology.[41] The concept arose rather as a semi-evangelical catchcry against ecclesiasticism, emerging from that personal piety, 'ethical idealism' and *imitatio Christi* so characteristic of the Low Church line.[42] At Oxford, however, few intellectuals who baulked at the ideas of the High Churchmen emerged as members of the Evangelical party. They were critical thinkers and not just concerned with practical Christianity. Besides, no one could 'deny to the Tractarians holiness of life', or an 'enthusiastic piety' which matched that of the evangelicals. What scholars such as Froude, Stanley, Jowett and Arnold found questionable about the pretensions of the High Church, rather, was its 'zeal for truth'.[43] Discussing the Newmanites in 1881, Froude wrote :

> "The human intellect, I believe, will never voluntarily part with truth which has been once communicated. It hates lies, lies especially which come armed with terror in the place of argument."[44]

With these words he matched truth against authority and found the Tractarian; wanting.

Froude's colleagues, similarly emphasizing the sacredness of truth, contended that no rigid ecclesiastical policy should ever be ready 'to suppress truth from respect of authority'.[45] Significantly they followed Froude in pitching the claims of the Reformation against the mediaevalism of Newman and Pusey :

> "Luther believed in truth with all his soul. He understood, as few others have understood, that truth will make us free—truth and nothing else."[46]

Jewett considered Luther's Reformation to be almost comparable to the missions of St. Paul.[47] Stanley admitted that it was 'surely a step in God's Providence',[48] and Arnold argued that Luther was the greatest historical representative of morality, the Teutons deserving the honour of being the most moral of all races.[49] This joint approbation of the German Reformation took the form, especially in Kingsley's case, of a kind of Carlylean 'Teutomania' in which the Catholic, authoritarian, yet immoral Romans were unfavourably contrasted with the moral, truth-loving, Protestant Saxons.[50] Bunsen's Teutonism was equally strong, although his dislike of the Romanic peoples not so overt.[51] Generally speaking, this Germanizing tendency performed the role of an ideological antidote against the 'revival of Romanism' in the Church of England, and the Reformation was envisaged as the decisive point in history when 'the divine right' asserted 'its supremacy over the right of Popes and Emperors', and when 'the religion of Christ' was resurrected on the disfigured remains of the institutionalised 'Christianity of the Church'.[52]

To summarize, those who espoused 'the Religion of Christ' were joined in a common pursuit of truth. They disliked ecclesiastical dogmatism and demonstrated their partiality for the accomplishments of Luther's German Reformation and their suspicious dislike of the mediaeval, inquisitorial, Roman frame of mind.

It is quite evident that Mueller was readily assimilated into the group which defended this cause, and furthermore that he adopted, even reinforced, the position of his new friends in the torrid intellectual environment of Oxford. Most of his new friendships prospered. When for example, the Froudes moved to Plas Gwyant, Wales, in 1850, they invited him to leave his translation of the Vedas at the Bodleian and stay with them. When Mueller declined with good reason, a very sad Froude wrote in reply :

> "I cannot tell you the extent of my disappointment; other men may come and go but I longed for you with *sehnsucht*, and my wife with me, who seems to care for no one among my friends except you."[53]

Long distances tended to deaden the vitality of this relationship, and after 1859 there was a long period of separation until Froude returned to Oxford as professor of history in 1892.[54] It is true that a similar state of affairs prevented Mueller from contacting Arnold between 1859 (when the latter was first sent to enquire into the state of English education) and late 1870 (when the publication of Arnold's *St. Paul and Protestantism* prompted correspondence),[55] but with most of the other members of the intellectual 'fraternity' Mueller was able to maintain continuous relations. Stanley and Bunsen were very well disposed towards one another, and when the former moved to Westminster to take up his deanery in 1863, both became Mueller's indispensable sources of information about European political developments and London affairs.[56] Kingsley and Palgrave corresponded consistently, and as for Jowett, Mueller commiserated with him when both of them were smarting under the stigma of adverse theological criticism.[57] But it is quite clear that Mueller was more than a mere friend to these men. He became one of the great protagonists of their theological cause, and certainly the greatest exponent at Oxford of the 'Religion of Christ'. As a Lutheran, it was not difficult for him to agree with an outspoken justification of the German Reformation.

> "There is no grander sight in history; and the longer we allow our eyes to dwell on it, the more we feel that history is not without God. . . . We call the Reformation the work of Luther, but Luther stood not alone, and no really great man ever stood alone."[58]

Neither was it hard for him to consent to the arguments of the Teutonists, for his love of the Germanic people was undying. He came to regard Germany and England as one in Saxon blood, deserving the future rulership of Europe,[59] and revealed his conscious racism during the Franco-Prussian conflict in 1870 by openly opposing Gladstone's policy of aligning England with the Romance nation of France.[60] To contend that the Saxons were the superior branch of the Aryan household was a simple extension of the linguistic and theological conclusions he had arrived at under Eugène Burnouf. Mueller assumed that the idea of Aryanism was part of God's truth being realized in national or racial consciousness, and he further supposed that the German mind and Teutonic blood were best fitted to make such a discovery.[61] On remaining in England he was naturally quick to stress that England should be considered a racial twin brother with the same great destiny. In 1859 he wrote :

> "the strong feeling of sympathy between the best classes in both countries holds out a hope that, for many years to come, the supremacy of the Teutonic race not only in Europe, but over all the world, will be maintained in common by the two champions of political freedom and of liberty of thought —Protestant England and Protestant Germany."[62]

Since Mueller shared many of the attitudes of his new acquaintances on historical and racial issues, it was not surprising that he should adopt their theological standpoint in the controversy with Tractarians. As a child of the Reformation, he was prepared to dissent from the Newmanites, and to support 'liberal Christian investigation' against the Oxonian conservatives.[63] His opposition to the High Church party was almost forced upon him because of the anti-German feeling which 'existed most strongly at Oxford. . . particularly among theologians'. 'With them,' he wrote, 'German meant much the same as unorthodox, and unorthodox was enough at the time to taboo a man at Oxford.'[64] But Mueller stood his ground. No one welcomed the sacredness of truth more than this learned scholar of Indian language and religion. He believed no science of comparative philology and religion was possible without the strictest respect for the truth.

> "The science of Religion will bring many a rude shock; but to the true believer, truth, wherever it appears, is welcome."[65]

He held that defenders of the faith should trust

> "that even unpalatable truths, like unpalatable medicine, will reinvigorate the system into which they enter."[66]

As for 'the religion of Christ', Mueller found it a useful concept not only to clarify 'his own undogmatic version of Christianity',[67] nor to counteract ecclesiasticism, but also to establish the real essence of practical Christianity, and the central differences between the Christian faith and the other major religions of the world.

> "It is necessary that we . . . should see the beam in our own eyes, and to learn to distinguish between the Christianity of the nineteenth century and the religion of Christ. Never shall I forget the deep despondency of a Hindu convert, a real martyr to his faith, who had pictured to himself from the pages of the New Testament what a Christian country must be, and who when he came to Europe found everything so different from what he had imagined in his lonely meditations in Benares. It was the Bible only that saved him from returning to his old religion, and helped him to discern beneath theological futilities, accumulated during nearly two thousand years, beneath pharisaical hypocrisy, infidelity, and want of charity, the buried, but still living seed, committed to the earth by Christ and His Apostles."[68]

Mueller, seeing the contrast between early apostolic Christianity and the modern Church, took up the 'poor man's gospel' of Froude and Kingsley. He advised a disappointed Indian friend, Keshub Chunder Sen, to

> "Let other people go to Church, to their Mosques or to their temples, but take you to your friends . . . to . . . your meeting-place, and after a short prayer or a few words of advice, send some of them to the poorest streets of the city, some to the prisons, other to the hospitals."[69]

Christianity must turn its attention back to its first century simplicity when it established the right to be uniquely supreme among the faiths of the world, when 'with its overpowering love of God and man', it 'conquered the world and superseded religions and philosophies more difficult to conquer than the religions and philosophical systems of Hindus and Buddhists'.[70]

All these views and sentiments were enthusiastically greeted by Mueller's new colleagues, and after months in which they had foreborn patiently 'with their German guest when he first tried in his broken English to take part in their lively and sparkling conversations',[71] it soon became evident to them that a scholar of unmatched qualifications had come to add fuel to the already blazing theological fire. But Mueller did not become a religious polemicist immediately upon encountering the heated debate between Newmanites and liberals. Hampered by language difficulties, it took some time before he made public announcements about the tenets of his faith. His first papers were not tendentious, one being a linguistic dissertation on the Turanian languages in 1848,[72] and another taking the form of a preface to his translation of the Vedas, treating 'the investigation of language as ancient history' (1849).[73] One could hardly view these as theological documents, and Mueller was emphatic that he was 'not a theologian' and that he 'always avoided theological controversy'.[74] But he could not escape embroilment. No matter how innocuous the two papers had been, the less liberal of the Oxford theologians watched the young German with the greatest anxiety, assuming from the first that he was unorthodox. Being a friend of Bunsen, his views were highly suspect.[75] The fact that the first paper had been done for the benefit of the Prussain ambassador did not count in Mueller's favour, and it was probably a major obstacle preventing him from obtaining the Chair of Sanskrit at Oxford twelve years later. The Tractarians had disliked Bunsen since 1841, when he had joined the Broad Churchmen in advocating a Protestant bishopric of Jerusalem; in fact it was this very proposal that had driven Newman to Catholicism.[76]

Mueller and Chevalier Christian Bunsen

Mueller's association with Bunsen did not lack compensations. Although being accused of liberalism, he found the

Prussian's friendly advice and encouragement concerning Vedic literature invaluable.[77] Mueller's greatest and constant love was the Vedas, and it was salutary to be on amiable terms with the one scholar in England who was thoroughly familiar with the wealth of Sanskrit literature. Bunsen represented the solitary thread between the world of continental philosophy and the forum of the Oxford debates. He commended Mueller's past endeavours in the fields of philosophy and religion, recongnizing the young scholar's intensive research at Leipzig, Berlin and Paris; but at the same time he introduced him to so many issues which were unique to the English scene. Bunsen admitted that the questions confronting English intellectuals and the English public were just as important as those facing the Germans; he agreed with Mueller that,

> "There is no country where so much interest is taken in the literature of Germany as in England, and there is no country where the literature of England is so much appreciated as in Germany."[78]

Mueller's key concerns were well suited to such experiments in 'universal peace and goodwill',[79] and he himself was very much preoccupied with questions which absorbed so much of the ambassador's attention, especially the great question of God's involvement in history.

> "Scholarship with him was always a means," wrote Mueller, "never in itself an object, and a study of the languages, the laws, the philosophies and religions of antiquity was, in his eyes, but a necessary preparation before approaching the problems. Is there a Providence in the world or is there not?"[80]

It was in fact with Bunsen's ideas of Providence, of *Gott in der Geschichte*, that Mueller was able to perceive the mutual relevance of German philosophy and English theology, to grasp the clear relationship between the German concept of historical progress and what Duncan Forbes has described as the 'Liberal Anglican idea of history.'[81]

There is no clear indication that Mueller held any simple Christian view of history in the decade before 1856. The philosophies of history propounded by Hegel, Lotze, Schelling and Burnouf were far from elementary. And yet in that year there begins a series of letters (first to Bunsen, and then to other intimates, among whom was his wife), in which he professed an extraordinarily simple, almost naive predestinarian view of the historical process. One recalls one of of his letters to Bunsen;[82]

> "Through my whole life I have learnt this one lesson, that nothing can happen to us unless it be the will of God, and this I believe now more than ever."

Here one is confronted with the extraordinary fact that, beneath Mueller's overt involvement in the issues and difficulties of conflicting philosophies of history, there lay his mother's faith, a faith which was to be suddenly re-enlivened in a community where the Word of God was considered a more precious treasure than Hegel's dialectic, where the Creation of the World was taken more seriously than in Lotze's *Mikrokosmus*, and where the historical figure of Christ still ruled over the changeableness of *Quellenstudium*. Admittedly, Bunsen and Mueller's other friends were liberal, but relatively speaking English theological liberalism was equivalent to the position of Neander, 'the pope of German orthodoxy',[83] and it was thus mild in comparison with the radicalism of Strauss, Bauer, Schleiermacher, Schelling or Schopenhauer.[84] Mueller was in a land where the traditionalists no more desired to grant concessions to free thinkers than they desired to possess a translation of Hegel or Comte. There were, of course, apostles of Spencer and the Mills, but in the 'forties and 'fifties such men were merely names to those who wrangled in the University halls of Oxford, or discussed Church-State relations in the Prussian embassy. How difficult it must have been for Mueller to accommodate his ideas to an English setting can only be imagined when we compare the religious views of Hegel, Lotze and Schelling with those of English philosophers of natural religion such as Butler and Newman. Mueller's German mentors had held that free and untrammelled exploration in the field of comparative religions would not ultimately endanger the religious consciousness of man. Hegel and Lotze had taught Mueller that orthodox Lutheranism and the scientific study of religion were not incompatible, while Schelling had convinced him that the two were ultimately resolved into the one, unified theology. But the approach of Butler and Newman was far more scholastic; they did not consider the search for truth as a form of free enterprise, but on the contrary, their researches into natural religion seemed consciously intended to confirm their already existing theological positions. Newman used Butler's *Analogy* to discuss the beliefs of primitive man, and assuming that 'natural religion is the foundation of revealed religion', he argued that primitive faith entailed 'a sense of sin, the dim consciousness of a fall, and the necessity of making atonement by the vicarious suffering of an innocent victim[85].' In this way the basic needs of man's religious consciousness were ultimately satisfied by the Cross. It is quite clear that Newman's starting point was not with a collection of historical data (as it was for the German philosophers), but rather with the doctrines of the 'Catholic' faith.[86] Mueller, whose education had inculcated a deep passion for liberal investigation, differed quite radically from this position and he could not but agree heartily with the endeavours of Froude, Stanley and his new English colleagues to put intellectual honesty before theological assumption. He put his trust in a thorough examination of documentary evidence, and not as Newman had done, in *The Penny Cyclopaedia*![87] But it was one thing to disagree with English scholasticism, and quite another to impose German philosophies of religion on a country which had barely enough time to appreciate Goethe and Carlyle. In any event, it was quite obvious (to instance the fates of Williams, Wilson and Colenso),[88] that few English scholars of the day believed that the avowedly objective study of the Bible (or of religion in general) could be undertaken without the study at some point impinging upon one's personal convictions. If Mueller desired to make his continental insights meaningful to his new audiences, it was imperative that he should discover the most expedient means of compromise—a *via media* between the extreme orthodoxy of Oxford and the extreme liberalism of Leipzig and Berlin. Those means were no better suggested than in the philosophy of his friend and benefactor, Chevalier Bunsen.

Bunsen's philosophy of history was recognizably German. In his *God in History*, which came into Mueller's hands by 1856, he adopted a somewhat Hegelian framework, dividing ancient History into four segments, and treating each part as a stage in the development of religious consciousness.[89] Like the great majority of his German predecessors he assumed historical progress, and declared that the history of ancient civilizations was unfolding in such a way as to anticipate the coming of Christ.[90] His view of progress was construed in terms of race, and perhaps the most interesting thesis of his work was the notion that the Aryans rather than the Semites were the true heralds of Christianity in the ancient world.[91] In the history of religious consciousness, therefore, the Aryan religions of East Asia and Asia Minor were said to have a far closer affinity with Christianity than had Judaism. Bunsen recognized that, historically speaking, Christianity possessed a Judaistic heritage, but he claimed

> "that our greatest business was to get rid of all that was purely Semitic in Christianity and to make it Indo-Germanic."[92]

He believed that although

> "the Hebrew Semites are 'the priests of humanity', the Helleno-Roman Aryans are, and ever will be, its heroes,"[93]

for it was through the Aryans that the greatest triumphs of art and culture were achieved. Bunsen had no compunction about asserting the supremacy of the Germanic peoples amongst the Aryans, and at times he virtually treated 'Teuton' and 'Christian' synonymously,[94] believing that the 'revelation of God in man's energies and efforts', God's 'firm path through the stream of ages', was no more clearly demonstrated than in the Protestantism of Germany and England.[95]

> "If England and Germany remain united, what can the power of evil effect? . . . We are agreed in the resolve to exert all the strength that is in us, to the end that neither superstition nor infidelity, neither priestcraft nor atheism, shall rule over the people."[96]

The importance of these arguments for the development of Mueller's religious ideas should be carefully understood, for it is clear that Bunsen's work made an immediate impact upon him. Writing to the ambassador early in 1856, Mueller confessed :

> "I must at least thank you for the mental enjoyment of your book *God in History*. . . . You place the Bible within the focus of history. . . . I can form no judgement on single

> points...the whole has therefore a greater effect on me.... The men in India were not foresaken by God, and if we cannot join in their prayers, the fault is ours. I do not yet despair of discovering the chord by which the dissonance of the Vedas and the Zend-Avesta and the Chinese Kings will be brought into unison with the key-note of the Bible. There can be nothing accidental, nothing inharmonious on earth and in history; the unresolved discords of the East must find their solution and we dare not leave off until we have discovered the why and the wherefore."[97]

Bunsen was the one person in England who was equipped to stimulate Mueller's interests in comparative religion and mythology, and the diplomat's assertions concerning historical progress and the role of the Aryans had a familiar sound to one educated in Leipzig and Berlin. Until the publication of Bunsen's *God in History* Mueller had avoided publishing in England on the science of religions. During 1856 and 1857, however, his renewed confidence was revealed in an 'Essay on Comparative Mythology', another on Buddhism, and a small prose idyll (which touched a great deal on religion), called *Deutsche Liebe*.[98] Bunsen's work had doubtless given him some feeling of assurance, and suggested to him how German ideas could be expressed in terms of English theology. The notion of Providence allowed him to combine German and English theories of historical progresss, while the theory of Anglo-German kinship enabled him to remain faithful to both England and his fatherland. It was thus Bunsen's example which provided Mueller with a foothold in English religious thought, defining the advisable limits of his first specualtions. In addition, Mueller found in Bunsen's language the kind of 'religious phraseology' peculiarly conducive to the English public.

> "Though through life a sworn enemy of every kind of cant, Bunsen never would surrender the privilege of speaking the language of a Christian."[99]

Mueller, significantly enough, consciously discarded abstruse philosophy from his writing, and gradually deleted the more difficult German concepts from his work—concepts, indeed, which English universities held in disrepute. He adopted the style of his benefator; remarkably simple and thoroughly Lutheran, sensible, and with real consideration for an audience unused to his interests.[100]

The predestinarian views he shared in common with Bunsen, moreover, were held by Mueller to the end of his life. In a a letter to his wife in July, 1860, some months before Bunsen's death at Bonn,[101] he wrote :

> "Surely everything is ordered for our true interests. It would be fearful to think that anything, however small in appearance, could happen to us without the will of God. If you admit the idea of chance or unmeaning events anywhere, the whole organisation of our life in God is broken to pieces . . . we are, we don't know where unless we rest in God."[102]

Later, in his epoch-making Hibbert Lectures of 1878, he asserted :

> "This trust that whatever is will be best, is what is meant by faith, true, because inevitable faiths."[103]

And in his last work, *My Autobiography*, he applied this belief to his own personal struggle in life, declaring that the 'only secret' about his success lay in the fact that he had 'had perfect faith'.[104] Although the notion of God's involvement in history was not new to Mueller—going back to his undergraduate days—it was not until the 1850's that it assumed a dominant role in his own philosophical writing. By 1867, when writing the important preface to his *Chips from a German Workshop*, he had the temerity to declare to his English readers that there were revelations of God's truth in non-Christian religions, and that religion, like language, grew as a continuous chain which neither possessed meaningless links nor extended aimlessly towards an indefinite goal.[105] Neither of these assertions was acceptable to the majority of the orthodox, but the unusualness of the argument was offset by Mueller's assurances of a providential plan, a divine process underlying the diversity of Man's achievements and the complications of humanity's trials. In this preface Mueller fulfilled his dreams of arriving at 'a true appreciation of the history of the world—that great drama in which nothing is without a purpose and a meaning, from the beginning to the end',[106] and in which 'Christ as the Son of God . . . the lifespring of all religion, is the greatest revelation of the Eternal will.[107] The publication of these opinions marks a point in Mueller's intellectual history which can be paralleled, let us say, to the appearance of *First Principles* by Herbert Spencer, the English evolutionary philosopher in 1862; they mark the first major statement of the essentials of Mueller's religious views. Mueller's ideas had been intricately fashioned by many and varied influences; by his Lutheran upbringing, by the debates between Weisse, Drobisch and Lotze, the lectures of Schelling, Bopp and Burnouf, and lastly, by one who, apart from Carlyle, had done more than any other to bring German philosophy and literature to the attention of the English.

> "Bunsen surely was one of the greatest spirits of our times. Where are the greater ones? To have known him belongs to those things which have bestowed upon my life the greatest value and the greatest charm."[108]

Between 1851 and the publication of *Chips*, a number of events transpired which made the final expression of Mueller's theory of comparative religion possible. When he had commenced to write on religion in the late fifties, the weight of adverse theological comment soon made itself felt. Pusey attacked him in 1857, he was censured in 1860 for favouring the controversial book *Essays and Reviews*, and in December of the same year (a week after Bunsen's death), the University Convocation rejected his application for the foundation chair of Sanskrit.[109] When Tuckwell wrote of the election for the Sanskrit professorship, he deplored the fact that a inferior candidate had been chosen before such a fine scholar and enumerated the indefensable reasons for Mueller's rejection :

> "first because Max was a German, and therefore a 'Germanizer'; secondly, because a friend of Bunsen must of necessity be heretical; and thirdly, because it was unpatriotic to confer an English chair on any but an Englishman."[110]

It was not surprising that Mueller consequently turned his whole attention to linguistics in the early 'sixties, producing his famed *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861-64), and a Sanskrit Grammar in 1866.[111] His translation of the Vedas continued.[112] Although he kept up his reading in the philosophy of religion and his correspondence with liberal theologians both English and continental,[113] he felt it necessary to evade theological issues as much as possible. There were certain aspects of his linguistic work, however, which, even as early as the fifties, had revolutionary implications for the study of religion, and which were destined to draw Mueller back into the forum of religious controversy. In 1901, N. Story-Maskelyne recalled the importance of his lectures on comparative philology (1851):

> "It was a new light, a new idea of literature....Natural Science was in high vogue then at Oxford, but the leaves on the trees were beginning to stir, so that when Max proclaimed his thesis that Comparative Philology and the historical development of language should rank with the natural sciences, there was a little rustle of skepticism, *though in fact he was anticipating the assertion of evolution being the key to natural science*."[114]

Comparative Philology lent itself to a study of languages in evolution, and Mueller's emphasis on growth and development was particularly conducive to the theories of the evolutionists. Herbert Spencer had no hesitation about using the linguistic findings of both Mueller and Bunsen to support his evolutionary hypothesis.[115] John Tyndall opened up an amicable correspondence with Mueller in 1863,[116] while Thomas Henry Huxley wrote to him in June, 1865, expressing regret that he had not previously availed himself 'of the aid of so powerful an ally'.[117] These interchanges quickly assumed theological importance, and in a controversy so delicate as the one relating to *The Origin of Species*, it was crucial that Mueller should clarify his position. But it was some time after Charles Darwin's *coup de main* that Mueller acted. He married in 1859, and in the following years Busen died, *Essays and Reviews* were published, and the Convocation refused to grant him the Sanskrit chair;[118] he was thus far too preoccupied to see the significance of the evolutionary debate immediately. It was not until the mid-sixties that he openly expressed his opinions on evolution, and then it was only in form of a short comment in *The Science of Language* on Darwin's linguistic views.[119] Small comments can have large repercussions, however, and for many scholars, Mueller had raised a vital theological question by his assertion that the basic and inexplicable distinction between man and animal was the former's possession of a language.[120] In 1866, Edward Tylor joined the ensuing debate, and although well disposed towards Mueller's scholarship, took up the cudgels for Darwin in a defence of Wedgwood's bow-wow theory.[121] The central argument of this theory, simply stated, was that 'human languages had grown naturally from animal barking and imitated sounds' such as 'bow-wow' and the primitive interjection 'pooh-pooh'.[122] Darwin had accepted this theory wholeheartedly as a small part of the evidence of man's evolution from lower forms of life, but it was not until his *The Descent of Man* in 1871 that the debate on this issue reached its hottest moment.[123] The early stages of this particular controversy were important for the further crystallization of Mueller's religious ideas; the opportunity to argue on issues of linguistic evolution gave him added courage to discuss comparative religion, and contributed to the ideas in the preface to *Chips* in 1867.

It is difficult to assess the immediate effect of evolutionary ideas upon one so preoccupied with the obscurities of Sanskrit etymology, but as with almost all scholars in the second half of the nineteenth century, there came a time when 'the problems stated by Darwin, H. Spencer and Haeckel' would have to be reckoned with.[124] It was as late as 1872, however, when Mueller sensed some real threat in the new discoveries of natural science :

> "It is impossible to decline battle, though no doubt it is fraught with dangers, nor do I see a chance of victory unless many positions which have become untenable are freely surrendered."[125]

Until this time he had not been ill-disposed toward any 'development hypothesis' (probably because there was much in the philosophies of Lotze and Schelling quite amenable to it), and he had not seen Darwin's *Origin* as inimical to Christianity.[126] It appears to be *The Descent of Man*, and the more anti-Christian treatises of Darwin's 'followers' which altered his opinion and led him to establish a more independent stand.[127] When he realized that the implications of Darwinism were rather different from German theories of historical progress, he voiced an open dissent.[128] We may safely say, then, that Darwinism had little or no effect on the development of Mueller's religious theory as it was presented in the preface to *Chips* in 1867, because, since his Leipzig days he had treated religion in terms of growth, and in the loosest sense of the phrase, was already a 'Social Darwinist'.[129] English evolutionary thought did not influence Mueller's philosophy in any other way than to impel him to establish his independence, to indicate that his ideas were far from unorthodox after all, and carried no vestige of the agnosticism so prevalent amongst the natural scientists of London.[130] When Mueller spoke of the 'Science of Religion' he was no protagonist for scientific sociology; he was not even a disciple of Émile Burnouf's *Science des Religions*.[131] He meant, in the most general terms, 'a critical examination' of religious forms, by comparison by attempting to 'explain the conditions under which religion, whether in its highest or its lowest form, is possible'.[132] And well he knew that his maturing religious ideas would be far more acceptable to the agitated, questioning England of 1867, than to the England swayed by the apparently inviolable forces of traditionalism in the 'forties and 'fifties.

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1. Mueller's *Auld*, pp. 76f.
2. I used the Seott Library edition.
3. *Ibid.*, eg. p. 29 (narrowness), chs. 9-10 (on the shallowness of the bishop), p. 9 (sermons), pp. 26, 49 (bibliolatry), pp. 19, 53f. (metaphysics), p. 55 (contradictions).
4. See W. G. Hutchinson's introduction to *ibid.*, pp. xxiii f., and also Mark Pattison, *Memoir*, London, 1885, pp. 215ff., cf. W. H. Dunn, *James Anthony Froude*, Oxford, 1961, i, pp. 138-41.
5. Hutchinson, *loc. cit.*, p. xxv.
6. J. H. Newman (1801-1890), the great exponent of High Church Anglicanism, the Oxford Movement or Tractarianism, was moving towards the Roman Church by the 1840's. Before producing *The Nemesis*, Froude had written *The Life of St. Neot* for Newman's *Lives of The Saints* : even in this he had betrayed liberal tendencies. Cf. Froude's 'The Oxford Counter-Reformation', in his *Short Essays on Great Subjects*, London, 1882 edn., iv, pp. 231ff.; Dunn, *op. cit.*, chs. 8, 13.
7. *The Nemesis*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 97, cf. p. 96.
9. See Froude's 'Autobiographical Notes', in Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 70ff. The word Tractarian derives from the 'Tracts for the Times' published by Newman, Pusey, Keble and their supporters.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

12. *Ibid.*, though Neander and Schleiermacher also feature in his reading list, see Hutchinson, *loc. cit.*, p. xvii.

13. 'Between men of intellect and priesthoods there has seldom been good agreement. Each regards the other as intruding upon his special domain. Priests and prophets went on ill together under the old dispensations. The prophet denounced the priest as a ritualist. The priest murdered the prophet with the help of popular superstition' (*Short Studies, op. cit.*, iv, p. 356).

14. See H. Chadwick (ed.), *Lessing's Theological Writings*, London, 1956, pp. 104ff., and J. Oman, *Schleiermacher on Religion*, London, 1893, p. 223 (though for Lessing they were equally false as well!); cf. E. L. Allen, *Christianity, op. cit.*, pp. 50, 57. For Newman's lectures, see A. W. Benn, *The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, New York, 1906, ii, p. 461, cf. Newman, *Essay on the Grammar of Assent*, London, 1903 edn., pp. 392ff.

15. The quotations are from *Short Studies, op. cit.*, iv, pp. 352, 355. On Lessing's position, see esp. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 93, cf. Lessing, *Education of the Human Race* (ed. F. W. Robertson), London, 1858, *passim* ; and on Schleiermacher, esp. Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 108, cf. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith* (trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart), Edinburgh, 1928.

16. 'Autobiographical Notes', in Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 99 (including the quotation).

17. Though note J. Stevenson, *Translation of the Sankita of the Sama-Veda*, London, 1842. Cf. Mueller's preface to *SBE*, i, (*The Upanishads*, London, 1879).

18. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 124 ('Is there a chance for Mueller, poor fellow : he is craving to be married'). As background, Bodleian MSS., sv. 18th May, 1848 (to Bunsen), pp. 6f.

19. *Auld*, p. 76.

20. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75f. as background.

21. See *LLM*, i, 77, cf. Bodleian MSS., sv. 18th May, 1848, pp. 6f., *Auld* pp. 92ff., 111.

22. *LLM*, i, p. 90 for the quotation, cf. Bodleian MSS., letters to Bunsen, sv. 24th and 26th April, 9th May, 12th Nov., 1849, Sept. 1850; *Auld*, pp., 77f., Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 238.

23. See Froude in *ibid.*, i, p. 147, cf. *Auld*, p. 77 for the quotation.

24. Clough to Hawkins, 3rd March, 1849, in *The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough* (ed. F. L. Mulhauser), Oxford, 1957, i, pp. 248f., cf. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 135.

25. L. Bonnerot, *Matthew Arnold poète ; essai de biographie psychologique*, Paris 1947, p. 130, cf. *The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough* (ed. H. F. Lowry), London, 1932, pp. 81, 111.

26. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 137. Jowett did little at this stage because he disliked the role of defending the unorthodox (cf. K. Chorley, *Arthur Hugh Clough*, Oxford. 1962, pp. 101f.).

27. For Palgrave and Froude, see Mulhauser (ed.), *op. cit.*, i, p. 166 (Clough to Arnold, 31st Jan., 1848), and for Mueller and Palgrave, *LLM.*, i, pp. 77, 94; *Auld*, p. 125

28. F. Bunsen, *Memoirs, op. cit.*, ii, p. 139 (yet cf. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 238), Mueller, *Chips*, iii, p. 413.

29. Concerning Stanley, R. E. Prothero and G. G. Bradley, *The Life and Correspondence of Arthur Penryhn Stanley*, London, 1893, i, esp. p. 374. For Jowett, who tended toward liberalism under Stanley's influence, see E. Abbott and L. Campbell, *The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett*, London, 1897, i, pp. 72-83, 98ff. On Clough, Chorley, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-113, and on Kingsley, Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 136, cf. Mrs. Kingsley, *Charles Kingsley; His Letters and Memoirs of His Life*, London, 1901, i, pp. 115-27.

30. For background to this liberalism, D. Forbes, *The Liberal Anglican idea of History*, Cambridge, 1952. Cf. F. W. Cornish, *A History of the English Church in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1910, i, pp. 217-19 for an exellent discussion of English liberal theology, of *Essays and Reviews*, Staney and Bunsen. Of Mueller's associates, Palgrave and (surprisingly) Bunsen were most sympathetic

towards High Church theology (cf. G. F. Palgrave, *Francis Turner Palgrave*, London, 1899, p. 37; *LLM*, i, p. 90; Mueller's *Chips*, iii, pp. 411ff.), and Kingsley the most evangelical (cf. Mrs. Kingsley, *op. cit.*, eg. i, pp. 193f.). For other books on the nature of this group's Anglicanism, see L. E. Elliott-Binns, *Religion in the Victorian Era*, London, 1946 edn., pp. 143ff., 207ff.; B. Willey, *Nineteenth Century Studies*, Harmondsworth, 1949, ch. 10; Lord Altrincham, *Two Anglican Essays*, London, 1958, pp. 108ff.

31. For Froude's teutonism and attitudes toward Carlyle, see esp. his *My Relations with Carlyle*, London, 1886, cf. *Thomas Carlyle; a History of His Life in London, 1834-1881*, London, 1884, 2 vols., Faverty, *Arnold, op. cit.*, pp. 119f., 146 and (against the Newmanites), Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 72ff. For Kingsley on the same issues: Kingsley, *The Roman and the Teuton*, London, 1879 edn. (preface by Mueller), esp. ch. 1; Mrs. Kingsley, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 33f., 60, 89, 189-91, ii, p. 12; Faverty, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17, 102-06; Mueller's *Biographical Essays, op. cit.*, pp. 372-78; *Auld*, p. 97. On Stanley likewise, cf. his 'The Theology of the Nineteenth Century', in *Fraser's Magazine*, LXXI, 1865, esp. pp. 260, 267; Prothero and Bradley, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 216, 373, 430, ii, p. 500; Faverty, *op. cit.*, p. 165; and on Arnold, see his 'Culture and Anarchy', in L. Trilling (ed.), *The Portable Matthew Arnold*, New York, 1949, pp. 511f., cf. p. 484; his *Democratic Education* (ed. R. H. Super), Michigan, 1962, pp. 306f.; and cf. W. Robbins, *The Ethical Idealism of Matthew Arnold*, London, 1959, pp. 55ff.

32. For background on Thomas Arnold's Broad Churchmanship and its influence, see Willey, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-71, cf. Cornish, *op. cit.*, i, p. 190; F. J. Woodward, *The Doctor's Disciples; A Study of Four Pupils of Arnold of Rugby, Stanleys, Gell, Clough and William Arnold*, London, 1954.

33. *The Nemesis, op. cit.*, p. 20.

34. See Mueller's *Auld*, p. 93 for the quotation, cf. p. 92; Mrs. Kingsley *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 161, 344-48.

35. Cf., on Kingsley, Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 96, and see Stanley, 'Theology etc.', *loc. cit.*, pp. 262, 267, cf. his preface to Bunsen's *God in History, or the progress of man's faith in the moral order of the world*, London, 1868, i, p. ix.

36. 'Natural Religion' in his *The Interpretation of Scripture and Other Essays*, London, Routledge edn., p. 381.

37. *Literature and Dogma*, London, 1876 edn., p. 189f.

38. Chorley, *op. cit.*, p. 54, cf. pp. 98-100, 108f., and on his agnosticism, Herbert Spencer, *An Autobiography*, London, 1904, ii, p. 62.

39. For Palgrave, note esp. his hymns, cf. G. F. Palgrave, *op. cit.*, ch. 4; and for Bunsen, *God in History, op. cit.*, ii, p. 426 (this passage not occurring in his *Gott in der Geschichte oder der Fortschritt des Glaubens an eine sittliche Weltordnung*, Leipzig, 1857).

40. See *Auld*, p. 126, where Mueller describes them as 'that delightful circle'.

41. See Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Bonnerot, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

42. See esp. Cornish, *op. cit.*, i, p. 33 who writes of 'ethical idealism'. Significantly, Robbins described Matthew Arnold as an ethical idealist in the title of his book.

43. *Ibid.*, i, p. 32.

44. *Short Studies, op. cit.*, iv, p. 356, cf. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p.10.

45. The quotations comes from Mueller on Kingsley, *Biographical Essays, op. cit.*, pp. 377f., cf. Mrs. Kingsley, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 165f. On truth in Stanley's thought, 'Theology', *loc. cit.*, p. 268; in Jowett, *Interpretation, op. cit.*, esp. p. 379; in Bunsen, see a letter quoted in Mueller's *Chips*, iii, p. 415; in Clough, Chorley, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-83; and in Arnold, see his *Lectures and Essays in Criticism* (ed. R. H. Super), Michigan, 1962, pp. 43f., 65, 67-69, 71f., 79, 81f., etc.

46. 'The Revival of Romanism', in *Short Studies, op. cit.*, iii, p. 185.

47. 'On the Character of St. Paul', in Jowett, *op. cit.*, p. 169, cf. p. 173.

48. 'Latin Christianity,' in *Quarterly Review*, XCV, 1854, p. 70, cf. 'Theology', *loc. cit.*, p. 261; Forbes, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

49. Arnold, 'Falkland', in *Mixed Essays, Irish Essays and Others*, New York, 1883, p. 177; 'A Liverpool Address', in *The Nineteenth Century*, XII, 1882,

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p. 718. cf. Faverty. *op. cit.*, pp. 29; 46, 58,90, 98,105.

50. *The Roman and the Teuton.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 1, Faverty, *op. cit.*, p.16. On Carlyle's Teutomania, see T. Deimel, *Carlyle und der Nazionalsozialismus; eine Wuerdigung des englischen Denkers im Lichte der deutschen Gegenwart*, Wuerzburg, 1937, pp. 121-29.

51. See *ibid.*, pp. 164f.. 172 for general discussion. cf. Bunsen. *God in History*, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 210f.; Mueller's *Chips*. iii. p. 412.

52. All but the last quotation derived from *ibid.*, iii, p. 27, and the last from a phrase ascribed to Mueller in *LLM*, i, p. 230. Cf. also Froude, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 13-206; Stanley, 'Theology', *loc. cit.*, p. 266; Prothero and Bradley, *op. cit.*, pp. 193, 298.

53. Dunn, *op. cit.*, i, p. 178.

54. See H. Paul, *Life of Froude*, London, 1905.

55. Cf. *Auld*, pp. 111-19, *LLM*. i, pp. 401f. (although Arnold lectured on Homer in Oxford, 1861, cf. W. F. Connnell, *The Educational Thought and Influence of Matthew Arnold*, London, 1950, chs. 3-4; L. Trilling (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 63-73, 178f., 182-85, 384f.

56. See esp. *Auld*, pp. 92, 100. 104, 110, 168; *AutoFrag.*. pp. viii, 5; *LLM*, i, ch. 10, and pp. 75, 94, 118ff. On Stanley's respect for Mueller's work, cf. his 'Theology', *loc. cit.*, p. 261.

57. Kingsley : *Auld*, pp. 74, 75, 91ff.; *AutoFrag*, pp. viii. 5, 64; *LLM*, i, esp. pp. 183ff. Palgrave : *Auld*, pp. 125f., *LLM*, i, pp. 77, 94, 113,121, 132ff., etc., Jowett : *Auld*, p. 126; *AutoFrag*, pp. 3f.; *LLM*, i, pp. 77, 94, 101, 118f., 146, etc., Abbott and Campbell, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 291ff.

58. *Chips*, iii, pp. 26f.

59. *LLM*, ii, p. 449.

60. *Ibid.*, i, pp. 376, 381-83. Further on Mueller's political views, J. H. Voigt, *F. Max Mueller; The Man and His Ideas*, Calcutta, 1967, pp. 52ff.; 'Friedrich Max Mueller und die Schleswig-Holstein-Frage in den deutsch-englischen Beziehungen', in *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fuer Schleswig-Holsteinische Geschichte*, XCI, 1966, pp. 177ff.; 'Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Theodor Mommsen und Max Mueller ueber den Burenkrieg', in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, II, 1966, pp. 66ff; 'Max Mueller's Political Thought', in *Max Mueller Bhavan Yearbook 1965*, pp. 55ff. Note also Mueller's later preface to Kingsley's *The Roman and the Teuton*, London, 1879, esp. pp. xiiff.

61. *Ibid.*, i, esp. p. 480.

62. *Chips*, iii p. 2.

63. Quoting Bunsen. in *ibid.*, iii, p.415, and on Mueller's dissent, see *LLM*, i, pp. 164f, 173, 195, 237, 242.

64. *AutoFrag*, p. 19.

65. *Chips*, i, p. xxvii.

66. *Ibid.*

67. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

68. *Chips*, i, pp. xxv, xxvi.

69. *AutoFrag*, p. 60. But Chunder Sen wanted some 'outward show and ceremony for the people'.

70. *Chips*, i, p. xxvi.

71. *Auld*, p. 126.

72. In Bunsen's *Outlines of the Philosophy of History* (*Christianity and Mankind Pt. II*), London, 1853, append., cf. *LLM*, i, p. 75. and, as background, Bodleian MSS., sv. 1851 (undated), esp. pp. 9f.

73. Sent to Eugène Burnouf, *LLM*, i, p. 101.

74. *Ibid.* i, p. 184.

75. Cf. *ibid.*, i, p. 164; Abbott and Campbell, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 291f., and for background, Bodleian MSS., sv. 9th May, 1849, p. 3.

76. See Cornish, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 264f., cf. Mueller, *Chips*, iii, pp. 135, 382.

77. See esp. *ibid.*, iii, pp. 411ff.; *LLM*, i, pp. 173f. It is important to note that Mueller's closeness to Bunsen was partly due to the fact that the latter was Protestant and Lutheran. As Mueller found no fellow Lutherans as Oxford, he transferred to the Anglican communion in 1851, and this, along with an honorary MA, enabled him to become a member of a college.

78. *Chips*, iii, p. 1; F. Bunsen, *op. cit.*, ii, esp. p. 183.
79. A phrase from Cornish, *op. cit.*, i, p. 264.
80. *Chips*, iii, p. 409.
81. *Op. cit.*, *passim*.
82. *LLM*, i, p. 186.
83. *AutoFrag*, p. 21.
84. Note Kingsley's attitude to Strauss, Mrs. Kingsley, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 193f. On the importance of these radicals for the German intellectual tradition, eg. F. Engels, 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy', in *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, 1958 edn., ii, pp. 366f.; A. Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus* (trans. W. Montgomery), London, 1954 edn., pp. 58-160; Loewith, *op. cit.*, ch. 5.
85. See Benn, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 333, cf. J. Butler, *Analogy of Religion*, London 1736, pt. 2; Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, op. cit., esp. pp. 392f.
86. See *ibid.*, ch. 5, and pp. 98-156.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 393.
88. See Benn, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 132f., 135 ff., cf. A. D. White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, New York, 1896, ii, pp. 342-57.
89. In comparison with Hegel (who took the Orientals, Greeks, Romans and Germans in their turn), Bunsen's dialectical course runs through the Hebrews, East Asians, the peoples of Asia Minor and Europe before Christ, and then the Christians.
90. *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 426.
91. *Ibid.*, ii, bks. 4-5.
92. Quoting from Matthew Arnold, cf. Bunsen, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 60-203.
93. *Ibid.*, i, pp. 219f.
94. *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 283f., and on Teuton supremacy in Bunsen, Faverty, *op. cit.*, pp. 164f.
95. Quoted in Mueller's *Chips*, iii, p. 373.
96. Bunsen to Stockmar, 1st Jan., 1852, in F. Bunsen, *op. cit*,.,ii, p. 183.
97. See *LLM*, i, p. 188.
98. See 'Comparative Mythology', in *Chips*, ii, pp. 1ff.; 'Buddhist Pilgrims', in *ibid.*, i, pp. 236ff. and note that *Deutsche Liebe*, first in German, was published in English in London, 1857.
99. *Chips*, iii, p. 375.
100. The frequency of German phrases in Mueller's works diminishes between 1860 and his last work, *Contributions*. F. P. Stearns came to rank his as among the great prose styles in the English language (*op. cit.*, pp. 288f.).
101. For Bunsen's departure from England, and his death, F. Bunsen, *op. cit.*. ii, ch. 16 (esp. p. 221), and pp. 392-99.
102. *LLM*, i, p. 238. I take this as a simple statement of Lutheran theology, though Voigt may take it as an example of Mueller's identification of the natural and the rational (*Mueller*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19f.).
103. *HL*, p. 371 (Mueller inaugurated the Hibbert Lectures).
104. *AutoFrag*, p. 10, cf. pp. 1-44.
105. *Chips*, i, pref.
106. *LLM*, i, p. 262. Mueller's concern for universal history parallels Bunsen's.
107. *Ibid.*, i, p. 256; *Chips*, i, pref.
108. *LLM*, i, p. 352.
109. See *ibid.*, i, pp. 195, 235, 243, 246, cf. White, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 343. M. Monier-Williams was elected to the chair. On this man's achievements (conspicuously neglected by Mueller), see O. Chadwick, *The Victorian Church*, London, 1970, ii, p. 38; and on his predecessor, H. H. Wilson, the foundation Boden Professor of Sanskrit, see Monier-Williams' *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1899 edn., p. ix and n. 4.
110. *LLM*, i, p. 244.
111. *Ibid.*, ii, p. 461, cf. Mueller's *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1859. Comments on Mueller's philological work may be found in E. W. Hopkins, 'Max Mueller', in *Nation*, LXXI, 1900, pp. 343ff. (reprinted in T. A. Sebeok (ed.),

Portraits of Linguists, Bloomington, 1966, i, pp. 395ff.); J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society; a study in Victorian social theory*, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 149ff., cf. G. W. Trompf, 'Kon-Tiki and the Critics', in *Melbourne Historical Journal*, IV, 1964, p. 58 and n. 87.

112. *LLM*, i, esp. p. 274.

113. Eg., with Stanley, *ibid.*, pp. 296, 307, 367, 372, etc., Bernays, pp. 201, 232, 240, 249, etc., Renan, pp. 216-18, 235, 250, etc.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 122 (my italics) ; cf. Trompf, *loc. cit.*, n. 87.

115. *First Principles*, sect. 123 (Thinker's Library edn., London, 1937, p. 312).

116. See *LLM*, i, pp. 275f (letter dated 14th March, 1863) ; *Auld*, pp. 171f.

117. *LLM*, i, p. 305.

118. For his marriage, etc., *ibid.*, i, pp. 225ff.

119. *Op. cit.* (1873 edn.), i, pp. 374f., ii, 91ff., 339, 343.

120. Cf. *LLM*, i, p. 450.

121. *Ibid.*, i, pp. 315ff., cf. Tylor's 'The Science of Language', in *Quarterly Review*, CXIX, 1866, pp. 398ff., esp. 428-30. Tylor was suspicious of Mueller's 'Aryanism' (p. 433).

122. The quotation is from *Auld*, p. 173, cf. Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, London, 1930 edn., pp. 110 ff.; H. Wedgwood, *A Dictionary of English Etymology*; London, 1859-1865 ; F. W. Farrar, *The Origin of Language*, London, 1886, pp. 24ff., 140ff., 175.

123. See *Auld*, p. 176, cf. *Chips*, iv, pp. 433ff.

124. Mueller to Gladstone, 23rd Dec., 1872, in *LLM*, i, p. 442.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 442.

126. Esp. *Auld*, pp. 172f.

127. The word 'followers' is important, cf. *ibid.*, p. 173. Note also Mueller' letter to Noire, 8th Feb., 1878 (*LLM*, ii, p. 442) : 'Altogether old Darwin is an honest fellow. The Darwinians are much worse than Darwin himself, and I think the word "Darwinism" ought either to be sharply defined or should be replaced by "evolution-doctrine".'

128. *Ibid.*, i, p. 442, ii, esp. p. 42.

129. In terms of R. Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, Boston, 1955, ch. 1, cf. *LLM*, ii, p. 42.

130. See *Chips*, iv, pp. 474ff.

131. See *Introduction*, pp. 27f.; *Auld*, p. 118.

132. *Introduction*, p. 50 and p. 17 for each quotation.

CHAPTER 3

THE MYTHOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION

Rudolf Metz described Max Mueller as

> "an investigator rather than a thinker, a philologist rather than a philosopher : his very many sidedness prevented his achieving a single unified philosophical doctrine."[1]

This statement is misleading because it disregards Mueller's considerable philosophical writings, and fails to recognize that a Christian philosophy written in a Christian country can leave much unstated or merely assumed. In the previous chapters I have given good reasons for acknowledging Mueller to be a Christian philosopher, and I suspect that, with the very givenness of the Biblical tradition, and with Christianity's capacity to be represented as 'a single unifying philosophical doctrine', there was much which Mueller did not feel bound to say or explain. Unlike such a thinker as Herbert Spencer, who was the most systematic of the Victorian philosophers and a man self-consciously independent of the Christian tradition, Mueller did not feel compelled to dwell on first principles, or to analyze the cosmos as a whole, or to offer a self-generated naturalistic alternative to the central teachings of the Bible. He also wrote very little about ethics *per se*, except perhaps in connection with Christian mission policies.[2] Few European philosophers of the nineteenth century, however, presumed to comprehend all aspects of the universe or of human knowledge, and not all were so adept at moulding a coherent, unified system. There is much which Mueller did not tackle, yet his erudition in the areas of linguistics. mythology, religion and cultural history was truly remarkable, and he did make efforts to interrelate his findings in all these fields, and even do so philosophically. He was a thinker as much as an investigator, a philosopher as much as a philologist and he certainly did not remain unaffected by the nineteenth century mania for single unified doctrines.

I consider most commentators to have treated Mueller's thought very superficially. Perhaps the best explanation for this lies in their apparent failure to extract any system from that 'long line of volumes' which 'covered wide and varied fields'.[3] It has been contended that Mueller was more in the tradition of Schophenhauer than of Hegel, and would 'construct no system into which each religion neatly fitted'.[4] Another even less favourable view is that, with no gifts for synthesis, Mueller voiced 'highly speculative (and often inadequately tested) theories' in a great variety of fields.[5] Such sweeping generalizations, however, indicate either ignorance or shallow reading, for there is little in Mueller's writings to confirm either of these views.[6] Certainly the West has not treated him with much kindness. His reputation suffered much the same fate as Carlyle, whose philosophy has been repeatedly misrepresented, and whose works have frequently been denied the consistency and order they deserve. The belief, nurtured at the beginning of this century, that Mueller's arguments were quite unfashionable and did not merit serious consideration, has persisted in Europe into the present decade.[7] The myth (created by such men as Isaac Taylor and Alfred Benn) that he was a 'romanticist',[8] and the unwarranted assertion that he was attempting to impose 'a philological frame upon a psychological science', have also died hard.[9] In the post-war era, furthermore, some will be tempted to deem Mueller's Aryanism a form of racism. Even if it is true that he neither lacked European disciples during his lifetime nor defenders at his death,[10] by far the greatest weight of western scholarly opinion has been unfavourable. His work, apart from the timeless translations of the *Rig-Veda* and the *Upanishads*,[11] has often been assigned to the museum of useless antiquities, and it is commonly supposed that nothing of permanent value remains in his scholarship. This supposition is, I maintain, baseless. Not only is it rewarding to reconsider his many and varied attempts at reconstructing the histories of words, myths and beliefs, but it is enriching to consider the overall meaning and thrust of his scholarly enterprise. A reconsideration will not always deliver him scot free from the hands of his critics—though I suspect his arguments have been more unfairly handled or grossly misunderstood than not—but it shall persuade us that he is worthy to be placed among the great European intellectuals. He was indeed a 'scholar extraordinary',[12] and the significance of his work is not merely Western but cross-cultural, for he has merited the admiration of many Indians and should continue to interest young present-day scholars still further afield. Perhaps it is not correct to affirm that Indians have always spoken in his favour,[13] but the lasting of his fame in their impressive nation confirms that Europeans have been far too premature in shelving his work.

If we are to isolate a governing principle in Mueller's philosophy, I think it safe to declare it as Providence. Mueller's Providence is comparable to the principle of evolution in the thought of Huxley and Spencer. Actually Mueller did not consider Providence and evolution to be incompatible ideas, but the part played by the former in the ordering of the created universe was of little importance beside its role in human history and in the progressive achievements of mankind.[14] Only by studying humanity could man catch his most revealing glimpse of the divine purpose, a purpose which, though grasped imperfectly, provided the key to all finite achievement and testified to 'a decided progress' and 'a gradual elimination of what is bad' in the world.[15] In November, 1865, Mueller wrote to William Gladstone (the leader of the House of Commons) :

> "Though no human mind can ever hope to discover or to understand the vestiges of the Creator and Ruler of mankind in the broken strata of history, yet the very search for them comforts and elevates the mind of man."[16]

In 1878, he declared to a congregation in Westminster Abbey :

> "We may do what we like, the highest which man can comprehend is man. One step only he may go beyond, and say that what is beyond may be different, but it cannot be less perfect than the present : the future cannot be worse

> than the past. Man has believed in pessimism, he has hardly ever believed in pejorism, and that much decried philosophy of evolution if it teaches us anything, teaches us a firm belief in a better future, and in a higher perfection which man is destined to reach."[17]

Unlike such an evolutionist as Spencer however, who believed that the Unknowable was veiled behind all the manifestations of the universal law of evolution, Mueller stressed that the study of humanity surpassed all else in bringing man to a profound awareness of the ultimate nature of things. The reason for this is obvious; his God was personal, and although natural laws spoke of God, they did not speak of His involvement in human affairs. 'The Divine, if it is to reveal at all to us, will best reveal in our human form'.[18] For this reason the figure of Christ was pre-eminent in his philosophy of religion, for in the Son of God was the 'fullest expression, and most perfect historical realization'of Anthropological Religion,[19] the visible involvement of the divine in the trials and aspirations of Man. His belief in the personal agency of God, in the reality of Providence, was therefore as much a unifying factor in his philosophy and research as evolution was in Spencerism. Providence was first established *as a posteriori*, in much the same way as Bunsen had confirmed it, and in a manner quite similar to Spencer's demonstration of the presence of evolution laws; but having been establised, it became an *a priori* principle, a concept giving hope and meaning to the world.

Mueller's Understanding of History and Human Knowledge

It is quite evident that Mueller's approach to issues of philosophy, whether natural, moral or abstract, was historical. He believed that historical facts were the only legitimate tools for deriving rational conclusions from 'the rational universe'.

> "In one sense," he wrote, "I hope I am... an Agnostic, that is, in relying on nothing but *historical facts* and in following reason as far as it will take us in matters of the intellect, and in never pretending that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. This attitude has always been recognised as the *conditio sine qua non* of all philosophy."[20]

Mueller recognised the central importance of distinguishing his historical approach from the method employed so commonly by the schools with which the names of Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, Lubbock and Spencer were associated. He believed himself to be a member of the Historical School with scholars such as Stanley and Froude, maintaining that no student of any branch of human knowledge should speculate beyond those historical facts which have been made available by the documents of the past or the observations of the present.[21] By contrast, he held that the disciples of Darwin and Comte, whom he termed the Theoretic School, hypothesized about a natural and human past for which they had no convincing historical evidence.[22] For this reason he could not accept the Darwinian theory wholeheartedly, even though he had believed in the 'evolutionary progress' of history since his Leipzig days.

> "If you can assure me that there are *historical facts*, real, visible facts, to support this transition from one species to another, or even from one genus to another, I trust you,"

he wrote.[23] But because the Darwinists had thrown out the coping-stone of history, their work lacked the requisites that Mueller had demanded of any scholar. For Mueller, the great danger of Darwinism, and its accompanying agnosticism, was its attempt to explain the phenomenal world in terms of mechanistic causes. Once the mechanistic supplants the historical, both the human and the divine seem to have been crushed by the inexorable wheels of nature, and the consciousness of mind has been overthrown by an insidious materialism. Mueller was a child of German idealism; he could not but join forces with a great body of 'neo-idealists' who were intent upon exposing the glaring fallacies of the 'evolutionary naturalists'.[24]

Mueller's approach to history was inseparable from his epistemological position, and the best part of his philosophical thought was derived from Germany. It was fitting that the great translator of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* should admit that

> "Nothing . . . can be more perfect than Kant's analysis of human knowledge."[25]

There is much in Mueller's philosophy that is neo-Kantian, and much in it which harks back to the discussions on Kant in the philosophical societies of Hermann Lotze and even Christian Weisse.

> "No truer word has lately been spoken than what, I believe, was first said by Professor Weisse in the Philosophical Society at Leipzig of which I was then a member, and was again more strongly enforced by my friend and colleague, Professor Liebmann of Strassburg, that if philosophy wishes to go forward, it must go back to Kant."[26]

There can be little doubt that Kant's theory of knowledge provided a convenient justification for Mueller's notion of the historical. Quoting the nestor of German philosophy, Mueller acknowledged that

> "sensuous objects cannot be known except such as they appear to us, never as such as they are in themselves."[27]

He followed this up by a contention (which, incidentally, is more reminiscent of Lotze than of Kant)[28] that

> "We never see a horse, we are only aware of certain states of our own consciousness produced through our senses; but that these affections presuppose a cause, or as we call it, an object outside us, is due to the law of causality within us which we must obey whether we like it or not."[29]
>
> "If then," he goes on, "we have to recognize in every single object of our phenomenal knowledge a something or a power which manifests itself in it, and which we know, and can only know, through its phenomenal manifestation, we have also to acknowledge a power that manifests itself in the whole universe. We may call this power unknown or inscrutable, but we may also call it the best known, because all our knowledge is derived from a scrutiny of its phenomenal manifestations. That it is, we know; what it is by itself... of course, we cannot know... but we do know that without it the manifest or phenomenal universe is impossible."[30]

These statements of his moderate idealism are pregnant with implications for science, history, metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. Mueller was asserting that all reality was only realizable in states of consciousness, that objects were not known in themselves but only phenomenally. As a result, knowledge is more a product of 'conscious perception' than of the objects perceived; the real grounds of knowledge are not inherent in the phenomena themselves (or in the *Ding an sich* as Kant used to say), since the only authorities for human knowledge are 'direct consciousness' and 'the conclusions derived from it'.[31]

Mueller considered that the first important implication of his idealism concerned language. He held vehemently that 'conscious perception is impossible without language',[32] and because of this, the problems of philosophy ceased to be abstract and became historical, and in the end ceased to be merely historical and became theological. For Mueller it was language, 'even in its most elementary form', which made humanity unique, which set up 'an impassable barrier between beast and man'.[33] He refused to believe with the Darwinians that language evolved naturally from the grunts and calls of the animal kingdom, and maintained that it was only through the first inadequate attempts at language that man was first made 'conscious of a difference between subject and object'.[34] Once words were used to describe acts or things, the first seeds of knowledge had been planted. Before words there can be no knowledge, but only perception; perception cannot bring about knowledge unless it is conscious, and conscious perception is only possible through language.[35] Mueller was not particularly concerned about the exact manner in which language originated—'whether that germ of language was 'slowly evolved' or 'divinely implanted',[36]—because he simply lacked the historical evidence to come to any legitimate conclusion about this. What concerned him was the way in which language distinguished man, because he noted that although animals shared 'the materials of knowledge,...the sensuous impressions' with man, these materials and impressions were, in the absence of words, useless for the inception of knowledge.[37] The emergence of a language, which is in some sense synonymous with the emergence of man, is thus a wonder of theological significance; one cannot tell how it happened, but that it happened is the sign and seal of the Divine Reason.

"If that germ of the *Logos* had to pass through thousands of forms from the Protogenes to Adam, before it was to fulfil

> its purpose, what is that to us? It was there, *potentiâ* from the beginning; it manifested itself where it was, in the paulo-post-future man; it never manifested itself where it was not, in any of the creatures that were animals from the beginning, and remained so to the end."[38]

Accepting this Providence, this *Logos*, as the underlying factor giving rise to language, and consequently to conscious perception, Mueller argued that all knowledge, from its most rudimentary to its most abstract form, presupposed a power which manifested itself in the whole universe of conscious thought. If the first thought is only possible through a pre-existing *Nous* or Mind, so is the last:

> "Unless these thoughts had existed previous to their manifestation or individualization in the phenomenal world, the human mind would never have discovered them and named them. We ought not to say any longer in the language of the childhood of our race: 'In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth'. As Christians we have to say in the language of St. John and his Platonic and Gnostic predecessors: 'In the beginning there was the *Logos*."[39]

Giving new significance to the concept which figures so prominently in the works of Burnouf, Hegel and Bunsen, Mueller claimed that in the very nature and development of the conscious mind, the divine purpose disclosed itself.[40] God manifested Himself, therefore, in the conscious. He was the *Logos* who made man's consciousness of the phenomenal world possible. For this reason the historical becomes supremely important, because history is nothing less than the history of conscious thought, and thus the history of God's involvement in the world.[41] Hence, Mueller was led to assert:

> "The only faculty we claim is perception, the only revelation we claim is history, or, as it is now called, historical evolution."[42]

Conscious perception marked the dawn of thought, and history represented its achievement.

In confirming his idealism by an examination of language, Mueller trespassed on the grounds of natural science. Although some of his ideas were acceptable to the Darwinists, such as his treatment of language in terms of an organic analogy, and his theory that languages had one common derivative,[43] he was quite outspoken against the naturalistic implications of an unqualified evolutionism.

"If I hesitate in following you," he wrote to Darwin early in 1875,

> "in your explanation of the last animal metamorphosis, it is not because I am afraid, but simply because I see certain elements in human nature which would remain unexplained."[44]

A month later he wrote to the Duke of Argyll:

> "I have no feeling for or against Darwinism, and I always try in approaching these problems to care for nothing that I may care for in my heart. . . . If Darwin's facts are irresistable, I should accept the ape-theory without a murmur, because I should feel that we are meant to accept it. But I feel with you that never was such a theory of such importance put forward with a smaller array of powerful arguments than by Darwin."[45]

In these letters he was speaking specifically about the transition from ape to man, and the rest of Darwin's theory did not interest him except insofar as it had a bearing on man's account of the universe. He deplored the Darwinists who had rejected their master's conceptions of 'four beginnings and one Creator' and who had eliminated the Creator and reduced 'the four beginnings to one'.[46] He perceived that *The Origin* could be used as a dangerous justification of mechanical philosophy, and for an idealist nothing was more insidious.[47] For Mueller, evolution was a concept and a *Logos* which had only recently been applied to the phenomena of natural science;[48] it could not be attributed with an objective reality of its own. It was to be considered only as a stage in the development of thought, and like the Creation story of Genesis, was 'the highest expression that could be given . . . at that time to the conception of the beginning of the world'.[49] The conclusiveness of Darwin's arguments could not be established, because, as Kant had shown :

> "the knowledge of beginnings is denied to us . . . all we can do is to grope back a little way, and then . . . trust."[50]

It was invalid to transform evolutionism into a philosophy which accounted 'for the world by *ex post* events' when such concepts as the 'survival of the fittest' and 'natural selection' were the products of a human *Logos* and were not by necessity inherent in nature itself.[51] In one's very use of words to describe the physical world one cannot expect to attain anything but inadequate images and metaphors of veiled reality.

In these arguments it is significant that Mueller anticipated the views of Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood. The notions that 'history is the history of thought' and 'all knowledge is historical knowledge'[52] assume but an inchoate form in Mueller's philosophy, but it is clear that he is demanding the scientist to see the subject-matter of science in terms of the development of scientific consciousness. For Mueller, 'the whole of our knowledge of nature' is a 'recognition of the *logoi* of nature by the *logos* of ourselves', and is thus history, for history is the history of 'direct consciousness' and the 'conclusions which are drawn from it' by our reason (*Logos*).[53] It is at this point that one may see the implications of Mueller's idealism for his approach to history and to historical facts as they are understood in their most commonly accepted sense. Nowhere in Mueller's work is his attitude to history better illustrated than in a passage from *Auld Lang Syne:*

> "Few scholars would agree with M. Le Bon that 'works of history must be considered as works of pure imagination, as fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts'. This is a French exaggeration. But neither are books of history meant to be mere chronicles.[54] History is surely meant to teach not only facts, but lessons also; and though the historians may say that facts ought to speak for themselves, they will not speak without a *vates sacer*. I am the last man to stand up for an unscholarlike treatment of history, or of anything else. But ... I do not call a man a scholar who simply copies and collates MSS, makes indices or collects errata. ... Were any of the great historians satisfied with that? Was not their heart in their work—what we call bias?"[55]

It is clear that Mueller recognized an objective side to historical facts, believing that any aspect of the phenomenal world of which man has been directly conscious, be it in the form of natural or historical events, is known, and that anything in nature or history which has been established by hypothesis or by theoretical assumption, is unknown. As a result, he had no doubts about certain dates—the years of Henry VIII's reign, for example. And for this reason he spent his life amassing an enormous amount of historical material for translation and scrutiny.[56] But he perceived that history was more than *Quellenstudium*, that it lent itself to interpretation; he was forced to admit that the very act of writing history produces new modes of consciousness :

> "History is not written for historians only. Macaulay wrote the history of the English Restoration as a partisan, and Froude made no secret on which side he would have fought, if he had lived through the storms of the English Reformation."[57] "When the historian has to analyse prominent characters, and bring them again full of life on the stage of history, is it not the artist, nay the poet, who has to do the chief work, and not the mere chronicler ?"[58]

With these significant statements Mueller had frankly conceded that although historical facts provided the only criteria for understanding the world, the world of direct consciousness, the world which excluded all possible knowledge of origins or of the course of evolution in nature, they *could* be subject to the changing tide of interpretation. There is no science of history, and although there is an objectivity in the events of the life of humanity, these events only represent the bare bones of history and not its final form in the consciousness of modern man.[59] It is at this point that Mueller's philosophy has turned a full circle; for in denying a science of history, or a sociology, Mueller believed himself to be denying that human thought could be treated in the way that the Darwinists had treated nature.[60] There is something in the very nature of history which will constantly elude the tools of the natural scientists, no matter how hard they try to discover its sociological laws. In the words of Froude,

> "the riddle of man's nature will remain unsolved. There will be that in him yet which physical laws will fail to explain—that something, whatever it be, in himself, and in the world, which science cannot fathom, and which suggests the unknown possibilities of his origin and his destiny."[61]

History, then, is by its very nature the only ground of philosophic thought, because just as the conscious perception of the phenomenal world presupposes a cause, and consequently, a Cause or Reason for the whole universe, so historical facts presuppose the cause of the conscious mind, and the whole of history presupposes a divine *Logos* who is veiled behind the individual manifestations of human thought.[62] History, therefore, is the history of God revealing himself to Man and of the union between the finite and the infinite; it is the hallmark of Providence; a Theosophy.[63]

This approach to history demanded a belief in historical continuity because it implied that the problems of the modern world could only be fully understood when placed in the context of the whole history of thought. Speaking of the Historical School, Mueller asserted that its chief protagonists want

> "to show that there is no break between the past and the present but that an uninterrupted continuity connects what has been thought of old with what is being thought at present."[64]

Mueller acknowledged that the evolutionists saw this continuity and that they desired to view the contemporary events and problems of modern Europe in the light of the whole evolutionary process, but he attacked them for confining the application of the theory of evolution to the objects of their study, and for omitting to see its relevance for their own conceptions.

> "There is continuity, not only in Nature, but also in the progress of the human mind," he wrote in a Lotzean vein, "and to ignore that continuity, to begin always like Thales and Democritus, is like having a special creation every day. Evolutionists seem to imagine that there is evolution for everything, except for evolutionism."[65]

Mueller's philosophy of history thus rān parallel with the theories of natural and social science propounded by Comte, Darwin and Spencer, yet never at any point meeting them on common ground. Mueller's approach required a search for the beginnings of history, because present thought could not be comprehended without uncovering the germ of thought; the evolutionists were impelled to discover origins, because present forms of life could only be understood in terms of the inchoate form of the physical universe. The Darwinists began with the formation of the earth and the universe, whereas Mueller began with the first historical manifestation of human consciousness, with the first known evidences of human language and religion, with the hymns of the *Rig-Veda* of India. He held that philosophy was justified in concerning itself with questions of origin, not when it applied the *ex post* interpretations of evolutionary theory, but when it proceeded back to the first vestige of a 'conscious perception' or an 'incipient concept', and then commenced to trace the gradual development of thought in history.[66] The delineations of this development may differ, but this is because it is inherent in the very nature of historical facts that they should be represented differently in consciousness, and should not be bound by the rigid natural laws and the logical constructs of those who explained the world in terms of mechanical cause and effect.[67]

This is the crux, and the unifying principle of Mueller's philosophy; that 'our last appeal must always be to history',[68] for it is in history that we find the essential nature of man, and the true revelation of how God 'brought about His mysterious purposes with the sons of men'.[69]

Mueller on Comparative Method and the Origins of Religion

It must not be imagined that in denying a science of history, Mueller denied science. Not only was he prepared to praise the discoveries and achievements of natural science,[70] but he was willing to concede that the scientific method could be applied to the study of humanity. It is of no small importance that he gave to four of his monumental works the titles of *The Science of Language*, *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, *The Science of Thought*, and *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*. But by science Mueller did not mean 'positive' knowledge, but rather comparative method. In an address at the International Congress of Orientalists in 1874, Mueller claimed that "the comparative method is the truly scientific spirit of our age, nay of all ages."[71] The distinction between positivism and the comparative method is subtle but important. When discussing religion, Mueller had no compunction in stating that 'the student of the Science of Religion...

wants to find out what religion is, what foundation it has in the soul of man, and what *laws* it follows in its historical growth';[72] but the foundation and growth of religion can only be grasped from within a civilization, from within the minds of the historical agents themselves, and never by imposing a premonstrated natural law upon the complex events of the past.[73] Growth is, therefore, fundamentally historical, as distinct from natural, and it has laws only insofar as the facts suggest them, and not because history instrinsically forms the subject matter of science. If science is to be involved at all, it is in supplying the method by which the historical facts can be seen in their clearest perpective. Such a method was for Mueller the comparative method, a method bringing all the great streams of thought together in order to comprehend the fundamental nature of man.

It is well established that Mueller was an unhesitating disciple of the comparative methods propounded by such eminent Germans as Bopp and Grimm,[74] but some of the implications of his adherence to the Comparative School have been clearly misunderstood. To take one example; Durkheim, after examining his religious views, concluded that Mueller should be classed with those scholars who,

> "by the comparative method, . . . believed one should be able to go back beyond the great religions, to a much more ancient system of ideas, and to the really primitive religion, from which the others were derived."[75]

It is easy to see how a scholar could arrive at such a conclusion, but it is nevertheless indefensible to credit Mueller with these views. Mueller certainly agreed with Bopp that a comparative study of Sanskrit, Lithuanian, Zend, Doric, Greek, Old Slavonic, Latin, Gothic and Armenian would enable one to construct many of the language forms in an original Aryan tongue, just in the same way as many Latin words could be inferred from a comparative study of Italian, Walachian, Rhaetian, Spanish, Portuguese and French,[76] but he did not pretend that this study would allow scholars to dilate on the history and philosophy of the original Aryan race. He held that, at the most, one can infer that 'the ancestors of the Aryan races were no longer dwellers in tents, but builders of permanent houses', because the comparative study of languages allows us to form hypothetical words for both 'house' and 'to build'.[77] But this, for Mueller, is not the same as history, and he stressed that the Historical School did not speculate beyond the safety of the facts. About the very distant past

> "we know nothing, we must be satisfied with knowing nothing, and the true scholar leaves the field which proves all the more attractive to the dabblers in *a priori* theories."[78]

It is thus not valid to contend, with Durkheim, that Mueller believed he could uncover 'an ancient system of ideas' or 'the really primitive religion'; he was prepared to proceed only so far as linguistic studies allowed. The fact remained, however, that the earliest known Indo-European languages had a name for a Deity, and it was the stress which Mueller laid upon this fact that apparently misled Durkheim.

> "We have in the Veda the invocations *Dyaus pitar*, the Greek *Zeu patēr*, the Latin *Jupiter*; and that means in all three languages what it meant before these three languages were torn asunder—it means Heaven-Father!"[79]

This startling set of parallels was, for Mueller, invaluable; it was far more than any newly discovered 'polished or perforated stone, or even a gold diadem',[80] and its value was not merely etymological, but *historical*.

> "These names are not mere names; they are historical facts, aye, facts more immediate, more trustworthy, than many facts in mediaeval history. These words are not mere words, but they bring before us, with all the vividness of an event which we witnessed ourselves but yesterday, the ancestors of the whole race, thousands of years it may be[81] before Homer and the Veda, worshipping an unseen Being, under the selfsame name, the best, the most exalted name which they could find in their vocabulary—under the name of Light and Sky."[82]

Why Mueller should emphasize the historical value of the conception of a Deity can best be understood by reverting to his notion that conscious perception is only possible through language. Once words began to denote the objects of perception, reasoning could develop. In view of this, Mueller considered the ordinary distinction between sense and reason to be exaggerated;

> "We distinguish between sense and reason, though even these two are in the highest sense different functions only of the same conscious self."[83]

He took up the old empiricist adage '*Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*' ('there can be nothing in beliefs which was not first perceived'), arguing that

> "religion, if it is to hold its place as a legitimate element in our consciousness, must, like all other knowledge, begin with sensuous experience."[84]

It was in the light of these premises that the primordial conception of 'Heaven-father' was so interesting, because although the Deity was construed in terms of a perceived 'object'—the sky—Mueller believed that the extraordinarily abstract *Dyaus pitar* of the Vedas was a most unusual possession for such an ancient community as the early Aryans of India.[85] In fact, it was more than unusual, it was the sign of Divine Wisdom. A concept so abstract in a language so concrete also led him to believe that its very presence in Sanskrit presupposed its considerable antiquity, and that it was the product of patient reflection. This in turn presupposed what was perhaps the most ancient of historical facts—Man's belief in God.[86] History, then, began with religion; and the whole process of historical evolution acquires overwhelming significance through these first known 'manifestations of a Divine Power'.[87] He affirmed in a vein reminiscent of the aged Schelling:

> "This real history of man is the history of religion; the wonderful ways by which the different families of the human race advanced toward a truer knowledge and a deeper love of God. This is the foundation that underlies all profane history: it is the light, soul, and the life of history, and without it all history would indeed be profane."[88]

In this statement he vindicated Schelling's view that not one, but *all* religions should be studied to discover God's purpose in the world. At the same time, however, his distinction between 'religious' and 'profane' history shows that he had not lost sight of Lotze's *Geschichte und Naturgeschichte*, that he still held that any attempts to study man scientifically, by a comparison of his languages, racial characteristics or religions, did not endanger either the Christian faith or the Christian understanding of divine Providence.[89]

Although Mueller believed that in considering *Dyaus pitar* he was disclosing the beginnings of history, it must not be imagined that he supposed himself to be discovering man's origins. Not only did he contend that the knowledge of man's primeval origins was denied to moderns, but he admitted that what he had uncovered concerning Sanskrit and early Indian religion was by no means necessarily applicable to all other ancient societies of which we have no knowledge. To quote Mueller :

> "Far be it from me to say that the origin and growth of religion must everywhere have been exactly the same as in India; let us here take a warning from the science of language. It is no longer denied that for throwing light on some of the darkest problems that have to be solved by the student of language, nothing is so useful as a critical study of Sanskrit. I go further, even, and maintain, that, in order to comprehend fully the ways and means adopted by other languages, nothing is more advantageous than to be able to contrast them with the proceedings of Sanskrit. But to look for Sanskrit, as Bopp has done, in Malay, Polynesian and Caucasian dialects, or to imagine that the grammatical expedients adopted by the Aryan languages are the only possible expedients for realizing the objects of human speech, would be a fatal mistake; and we must guard from the very first against a similar danger in a scientific study of the religions of mankind. When we learnt how the ancient inhabitants of India gained their religious ideas, how they elaborated them, changed them, corrupted them, we may be allowed to say that possibly other people also may have started from the same beginnings, and may have passed through the same vicissitudes. But we shall never go beyond, or repeat the same mistakes of those who, because they found or imagined they found fetish-worship among the least cultivated races of Africa, America and Australia, concluded that every uncultivated race must have started from fetishism in its religious career."[90]

At this point one can see how Mueller's strict adherence of the 'Historical School' alienated him from the methods of scholars such as Tylor, Lubbock and Spencer. Mueller based his study of religion on historical documents, the earliest being the *Rig-Veda*, whereas his three contemporaries derived most of their major conclusions from a wealth of ethnological and anthropological material on modern 'savages'. Mueller attacked the theoretical hypothesis of de Brosses and Comte, claiming that it was based on spurious evidence, and accusing the 'fetishists' of taking 'that for granted which has to be proved'.[91] He argued that they had proved what they were trying to deny, because in speaking of the universality of fetishism amongst primitive peoples, they had unjustifiably assumed that

> "every human being was miraculously endowed with the concept of what forms the predicate of every fetish, call it power, spirit or god. They have taken for granted that causal objects, such as stones, shells, the tail of a lion, a tangle of hair, or any such rubbish, possess in themselves a theogonic or god-producing character."[92]

For Mueller no object could be called divine, nor ascribed with spiritual powers, if either 'poet, spirit or god' had not been conceived of beforehand. There is no reason why even the most unusual occurrences associated with natural objects should produce an incipient concept of the spiritual, or of god as distinct from some vague feelings provoked by the uncertainties of nature.[93] Mueller conceded that any conception of God was only possible after many struggles of the human mind, but could not agree that the fetishism of modern 'savages' represented the vestige of a religion more primitive than that presented in the *Rig-Veda*.[94] Enraptured by the first known conception of the divine, he felt that

> "more and more the image of man rises before us, *noble and pure from the very beginning*.... As far as we can trace back the footsteps of man, even on the lowest strata of history, we can see that *the divine gift of a sound and sober intellect belonged to him from the first, and the idea of humanity emerging slowly from the depths of an animal brutality can never be maintained again*."[95]

This particular statement was made three years before the publication of Darwin's *Origin*, but Mueller did not retract his views.[96] On the basis of historical evidence, Mueller was prepared to assert that ancient man was more rational than the modern primitives who worshipped fetishes and just as rational as those who possessed far more refined conceptions of a Deity. It was upon this crucial premise that the mythological theory of religion was founded, and this premise was, in turn, based upon the assumption that history, rather than sociological or anthropological theory, would lay bare the true nature on man and man's religion.

The importance of this premise not only for Mueller's theory of religion, but his whole philosophy, is evident, for it carries the implication that there is something in the nature of man which makes him religious. He was too much of a disciple of Schelling to think that man's religion was supernaturally revealed : 'all is natural , all is intelligible, and only in that sense truly revealed'.[97] If the Divine Wisdom was in history, He involved Himself within it and did not impose Himself from without.[98] Man's religion, then, must be 'natural' to him, in the sense that if he lacked a *potentia* for religion, he was something other than man. Mueller sought the appropriate terms to describe this aspect of Man's nature. In his lectures at the Royal Institution in 1870 he spoke of a 'faculty of apprehending the Infinite', contending that

> "without that faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes, would be possible; and if we all but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God."[99]

By distinguishing this faculty, he considered that he had extended and improved upon Kant's epistemological postion :

> "This has always seemed to me the vulnerable point in Kant's philosophy, for if philosophy has to explain what is, not what ought to be, there will be and can be no rest till we admit that there is in man a third faculty, which I call simply *the faculty of apprehending the Infinite, not only in religion, but in all things;* a power independent of sense and reason, but *yet a very real power, which has held its own from the beginning of the world*, neither sense nor reason being able to overcome it, while it alone is able to overcome in many cases both sense and reason."[100]

Critics disliked his use of the word faculty, because of its scholastic connotations,[101] and Mueller was soon forced to admit that, to some extent, he shared their objections.[102] But he continued to believe his earlier attempts at defining man's apprehension of the Infinite were basically sound and stated, in his inaugural Hibbert Lectures of 1878, that his opponents had taken faculty to signify a 'substantial something', when it really meant 'a mode of action'.[103] He asserted that, like the faculty of reason, the faculty apprehending the Infinite arose out of the perception of the finite world and, thus, did not represent the introduction of any new 'mysterious element into psychology'.[104] He maintained that the apprehension of the Infinite was a direct result of man's first consciousness of limitation. The feeling that our perception is limited spatially and temporally, for example, 'forces the idea of the infinite upon us, whether we like it or not',[105] because immediately man's perception breaks down and he becomes consious of the unlimited. 'He suffers from the invisible', and the unlimited and invisible are but 'special names for the infinite'.[106] This consciousness is therefore derived just as much from the 'earliest sensuous perceptions' as reason was; it 'evolved from what, *from the very* beginning, is infinite in the perception of our senses'.[107]

Mueller stressed that this apprehension of the Infinite was clearly present in the *Rig-Veda*, in the first historical evidence of religion. This apprehension was thus

> "the deepest foundation of all religion, and the explanation of that which before everything—before fetishism, and figurism, and animism, and anthropomorphism—needs explanation."[108]

The *Rig-Veda* reflected religion in a state of primitive purity (hence its significane for understanding the course of history), and it was likely that the primitive cultures older than Aryans of India possessed conceptions of the Deity 'purer and better' than the 'savage' communities of today.[109] Mueller was thus arguing that in the course of historical evolution, many religions had undergone retrogression, and did not conform to the laws of progress outlined by the 'Darwinists'.[110]

> "Even if it could be proved that there has been a continuous progression in everything else, no one could maintain that the same applied to religion."[111]

In arriving at such a position Mueller was confirming the supreme importance of the *Rig-Veda* for the study of religion, and at the time indicating the weaknesses of those who, in speculating about the religions of modern savages, neglected the earliest historical documents of man's religious consciousness. He believed that, whereas he was studying the past, the Darwinian theorists were merely anthropologists examining the present. All Mueller's comments upon so-called savages were made in the light of his Vedic studies, and instead of assuming that fetishism, ghost-worship or animism were the earliest forms of religion, he isolated the 'vague and hazy' ideas of the Infinite amongst primitive peoples and claimed that these exhibited the remnants of a better and more rational religion of the ancient past.[112] He illustrated this theory by referring to the Melanesian concept of *Mana*, discovered by R. H. Codrington, yet strictly adhering to historical facts, he did not presume to probe too deeply into the dim unknown.[113] It was the Vedas which merited the greatest attention, as did that most noble race which created them—the Aryans.

Mueller on the Aryans and the History of Religions

It has been pointed out that Mueller's acceptance of an 'Aryan' family of languages goes back to his reading of Bopp's *Comparative Grammar* at Leipzig, and that his treatment of the Aryans as 'race' and ethnic 'family' can be traced back as far as his encounter with the philosophy of Hermann Lotze.[114] Not until his first series of *Lectures on the Science of Languages*, however, did Mueller's Aryanism receive any emphasis in his written work.[115] The combined influence of Burnouf and Bunsen bore fruit at a time when Mueller was deliberately avoiding theological controversy, and although it was not initially applied to religion, the concept of Aryanism soon figured prominently in his religious theory. He asserted that almost all Europeans were Aryans, that there was a time

> "when the first ancestors of the Indians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slavs, the Celts and the

> Germans were living together within the same enclosures, nay under the same roof .... probably on the highest elevation of Central Asia."[116]

Of the English racial heritage he wrote :

> "There is not an English jury nowadays which, after examining the hoary documents of languages, would reject the claim of a common decent and a legitimate relationship between Hindu, Greek and Teuton."[117]

Few facts were more interesting for Mueller than the adoption of Christianity by the European members of this Aryan family : for it was this very fact which allowed the first religion of history (Hinduism), and the supreme religion (Christianity), to be viewed in terms of the continuity of historical evolution. In the Aryan Vedas he saw the 'incipient apprehension' of the Infinite; in Christianity (or more specifically, the Religion of Christ), he saw the final religion, the consummation of the 'unconscious progress' of 'the whole history of the world',[118] Never at any time did he go so far as to agree with Emile Burnouf's extraordinary conclusion

> "that the religion of Christ was not derived from the Semites but that the 'ancient law' contained a portion of the Aryan doctrines which Jesus came 'not to destroy but to fulfil."[119]

It was not displeasing to him to think of Jesus as a Semite; the anti-semitic, pro-Aryan tendencies of de Gobineau and Renan did not attract him.[120] If he favoured any of the attitudes of the French liberals at all, it was their sympathy for the philosophical speculations of Alexandrian Gnosticism and Neoplationism.[121] His Aryanism was relatively moderate. He agreed with the Burnoufs that the Johannine concept of the *Logos* was Aryan, and that it had elevated Christianity to metaphysical heights far surpassing the spiritual achievements of Judaism.[122] He also agreed with Renan (and with Bunsen) that it was the Indo-European conceptions of early Christianity which enabled it to escape from the narrow confinements of the old Jewish *Torah*.[123] The emergence of early Christianity marked, in Stanley's terms, one of the crucial points in history where 'the Semitic and the Japhetic (i.e. European) elements crossed each other',[124] and this indeed was extremely important for

Mueller's understanding of the providential course of world history.[125] But at no stage did he enunciate any racist doctrine, and his approach to Semitic religions was both sympathetic and objective.[126]

Mueller's Aryanism should be placed in perspective. His broadest classification of religions was based on his divisions of languages, and he argued that as it was possible to infer three basic languages—the Aryan, Semitic and Turanian—so it was possible to conclude that there have existed three basic religions. Mueller did not speculate about the form of these religions, he merely stated,

> "first of all, that there is a natural connection between language and religion and that therefore the classification of languages is applicable also to the ancient religions of the world . . . secondly, that there was a common Aryan religion after the separation of the Aryan race, a common Semitic religion after the separation of the Semitic race, a common Turanic religion after the separation of the Chinese and the other tribes belonging to the Turanian class. We found, in fact, three ancient centres of religion as we had found before three ancient centres of language, *and we have thus gained, I believe, a truly historical basis for a scientific treatment of the principal religions of the world*."[127]

He further subdivided this classification and declared

> "that number of the real *historical* religions of mankind amounts to no more than eight. The Semitic races have produced three—the Jewish, the Christian,[128] the Mohammedan; the Aryan, or Indo-European races, an equal number—the Brahman,[129] the Buddhist, and the the Parsi. Add to these the two religious systems of China, that of Confucius and Lao-tse, and you have before you what may be called the eight distinct languages or utterances of the faith of mankind from the beginning of the world to the present day."[130]

Given the materials accessible to Mueller, the categories he employed were self-evident, and there was nothing unusual about this 'religious map of the whole world'.[131] But Mueller admitted that the establishment of his classification did not mean that modern scholarship knew all it wished to know about the origin and growth of religion. Only in one of

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the broadest religious divisions, for example, could the whole historical process of religious development be studied, the Aryan division. With the *Vedas*, the *Brahamanas*, the *Zend-Avesta*, the *Upanishads* and the Buddhist *Tripitaka*, *Dharma* and *Abhidharma*, with the pantheons of the Greeks, Romans, of the Teutons and the Norsemen, even with the agnostic elements in Christianity, the whole evolution of Aryan religious consciousness was disclosed.[132] Mueller believed that there were three periods in the evolution of any religion. In his Gifford Lectures of 1889, he spoke of the Physical, Anthropological and Psychological stages;[133] a decade earlier he expounded on the 'perfectly natural and intelligible process' from Henotheism, through Polytheism, to Monotheism.[134] He pointed out that these stages depended upon changes in languages, because language dictated the nature of the conception of God. In view of this, there were times when Mueller described the main periods in the development of *both* language and religion with the same terms, although he allowed for a time-lag between any new development in language and its parallel stage in religion.[135]

The first period in Man's language he called the Rhematic Period;

> "this period forms the first in the history of man,—the first, at least, to which even the keenest eye of the antiquarian and the philosopher can reach."[136]

During this period, language was 'not impressed with any individual or national peculiarities',[137] nor was there any clear distinction between the Aryan, Semitic and Turanian linguistic groups. Mueller does not pretend that the religious ideas which follow this stage can be known, although he emphasized that the highly abstract concept of *Dyaus pitar* in the Vedas (dated to X-1,000 BC) indicated the great antiquity of the idea of a supreme Being.[138] Thus, the first known stage in the history of religious consciousness follows, not the first, but the second known period in the development of language, and despite Durkheim's claims, Mueller never presumed to know anything about the religious ideas which followed the Rhematic Period of language except the safely inferred fact that there existed some 'incipient concept' or some word for God.[139] The second period of linguistic development was called the Dialectic Period, during which at least two families of language, the Semitic and the Aryan, separated from the agglutinative Turanian speech.[140] It was following the formation of these families that Henotheism, and 'Physical Religion' emerged, and was best illustrated in the Vedic Hymns. Mueller linked Henotheism with the evolution of languages by speaking of it as 'the Dialectic period of Religion'.[141] By Henotheism he meant 'a worship of single gods',[142] contending that

> "when these individual gods are involved, they are not conceived as limited by the power of others, as superior or inferior in rank. Each god is to the mind of suppliant as good as all the gods."[143]

Mueller maintained that the *Rig-Veda* was a collection of hymns and invocations to various *Devas* or gods, these hymns being handed down orally 'by memory kept under strictest discipline', before being systematized and arranged in the Mantra period (1000-800 BC). This meant that *Dyaus pitar* (Heaven-Father) was invoked only by one among many Aryan groups, and that other cults sang praises to *Agni*, fire, *Suyra*, the sun, *Indra*, the rainer and parent of the dawn, *Marutas*, the storm-gods, and so on.[144] This did not detract any importance from the concept of *Dyaus pitar*, for his worshippers called upon him as a single god (even though they tolerated neighbouring cults), and gave him the extraordinarily significant name of 'father'.[145] In addition to this it could be established that, etymologically, *Dyaus pitar* was the earliest of the Vedic *Devas*.[146] Mueller did not stress the localization of cults in the ancient Indian village as more recent scholars have done,[147] but he was quick to point out that the basic difference between Henotheism and Polytheism lay in the former's absence of a pantheon, and the latter's 'worship of many deities, which together form one divine polity under the control of one supreme god'.[148] The separate deities of the *Rig-Veda* provided the best exemplification of Henotheism in the history of religions, but also illustrated very well what Mueller termed 'Physical Religion'. He argued that the Vedic deities had arisen, not from fetishism, ancestor-worship or animism, but from an inevitable feeling of 'the overwhelming pressure of the infinite' in nature.[149]

> "At first sight nothing seemed less natural than nature. Nature was the greatest surprise, a terror, a marvel, a standing miracle, and it was only on account of their permanence, constancy and regular recurrence that certain features of that standing miracle were called natural, in the sense of foreseen, common, intelligible....It was the vast domain of surprise, of terror, of miracle, the unknown, as distinguished from the known, or, as I like to express it, the infinite, as distinct from the finite, which supplied from the earliest times the impulse to religious thought and language."[150]

It was because of the perception of the phenomenal world of nature that the first historical conceptions of the deity arose, and these conceptions, dictated by the concrete nature of early language, took the form of poetic images. Names such as Sky-Father, Fire, Dawn, then, represented Man's early struggles to express the incomprehensible and the infinite in the absence of abstract nouns.[151] Mueller emphasized that the use of these names was magic and not literal, that it was not legitimate to argue that the ancient Indian was praying to fire when he invoked *Agni*.[152] He quoted sayings from the Vedas, such as 'firm, not a rock as distinct from 'firm like a rock', to demonstrate how the hymn-writers laid 'stress on the dissimilarity, in order to make the similarity to be felt'.[153] By the use of this evidence, Mueller endeavoured to show that the origin of the Vedic Henotheism was not in the ignoble superstition of the ghost-worshipper, but in Man's natural wonder at God's creation. In this period, there was an identifiable progression from a concrete to a more abstract conception of gods, a progression from 'the known to the unknown, from nature to nature's God.'[154] The fact remained, however, that in the second phase of religious consciousness identified by Mueller, that of Polytheism and Anthropological Religion, what was initially metaphorical became susceptible to verbal abuse.

The elaborate display of Henotheism in the Vedas was one of the principal reasons why Mueller attached so much importance to these extraordinary hymns. Although there were 'traces of it in Greece, in Italy, in Germany, in China' and, as Renouf had showed, Egypt, no religious document exhibited the nature of Henotheism so clearly as the *Rig-Veda.*[155] Mueller believed the ancient hymns to the individual *Devas* of India were rare memorials of humanity which threw light on those faiths whose historical beginnings were more obsure.[156] But the second stage of religion was well documented, and far more amenable to scientific comparison. The second stage was preceded by the third linguistic period, called the 'Mythological or Mythopoeic Age'.

> "It is a period in the history of the human mind, perhaps the most difficult to understand, and the most likely to shake our faith in the regular progress of the human intellect."[157]

The 'Mythological Age' testified to 'the bewitching action of language', the dangerous transformation of religious imagery into reality.[158] Mueller referred to the retrogressive changes of this third linguistic period as 'the disease of language' and consequently 'thought', for he held that mythology arose by misconstruing the original and purer meaning of a metaphor, and by turning the intangible predicate of an image into something tangible.[159] Unintelligible and unhealthy conceptions of the Deity and deities soon resulted, and these Mueller lamented.

> "To represent the supreme God as comitting every kind of crime, as being deceived by men, as being angry with his wife and violent with his children, is surely proof of a disease, of an unusual condition of thought, or, to speak more clearly, of real madness."[160]

Mueller was not prepared to grace the clouded perception resulting from mythology as religious. He understood religion as a rational attempt to apprehend the Infinite, and a *sane* approach to morality, and because most myths, no matter how integral they were to a religion, did not conform to this prescription, he was forced to isolate the mythological frame of mind and speak of it in terms of 'disease' and 'parasitic growth'. Thus when he wrote,

> "Nothing is excluded from mythological expression; neither morals nor philosophy, neither history nor religion, have escaped the spell of that ancient sibyl. But mythology is neither philosophy, nor history, nor religion, nor ethics,"

he was, on the one hand, stressing how the mythological disease had affected all aspects of ancient thought, and on the other hand, asserting that as a disease should be distinguished from a healthy body, so mythology should be examined separately from the sounder aspects of human thought.[161] Mythology was integral to the second stage of religious consciousness because

> "the gods of ancient mythology, whether in India or Persia in Babylon or Nineveh, in Egypt, among Fins or Laps, among Greeks or Romans, were originally derived from nature,"

just as the most ancient single gods of the Vedas were.[162] But once mythology has been admitted into the stream of religious thought it

> "is very rapacious and capacious, and may receive ever so many tributaries from different sources which require a special study and careful analysis."[163]

The creative work of language in the Mythological Age led to the incredible biographies of the gods, which in turn produced stories of relationships, and war, between gods.[164] Treating the gods together, and in fact sometimes confusing their roles, led to the kind of pantheons necessary for Poletheism.[165] Thus mythology laid the linguistic and mental groundwork for the idea of 'many gods . . . subordinated to the one supreme God'.[166] But although mythology was conducive to Polytheism, the essential difference between the disease of thought and genuine religious consciousness must be noted. The belief in Zeus, for example, was

> "religious in so far as the Greeks considered him the supreme God, father of humanity, protector of laws, avenger of crimes, etc; but all that which concerned the biography of Zeus, his marriages and his adventures was only mythology."[167]

This stage of religious evolution was clearly discernable in the histories of most ancient civilizations. It was true that the Aryan race, with the Brahmanas of India, the Gathias of early Zoroastrianism, Homer and Hesiod of Greece, Virgil of Rome and the Sagas of the North, 'suffered from mythology' more than the Semitic races, yet the first chapter of *Genesis* indicated that the Hebrew religion had not altogether escaped 'the influence of a process which is inherent in the very nature and growth of language.'[168] The Turanians also possessed a mythological tradition, accompanied by a Polytheism in which

> 'some higher power....sometimes called the Father, the old One, who is the Maker and Protector of the world'

was worshipped with 'the spirits of nature' and 'the spirits of the departed'.[169] This religious phase, which presented the most documentary material and yet the most complexities, marked the emergence of 'Anthropological Religion'. The gods were considered anthropologically as 'superhuman' beings, or men and women 'not merely human'.[170] The tendency of Anthropological Religion was to personalize or anthropomorphize the gods, even if they had previously been associated, magically, with the physical world.[171]

Mueller contended that, at this stage, the phenomena of fetishism, animism, and ancestor worship arose. They were secondary and not primary in religious evolution, and their widespread existence amongst modern 'savages' was produced by the devastating affect of 'the disease of language'.[172] In conformity with the general anthropopathy which prevailed in the second phase of the religious development of any given culture, ancestor-worship emerged because

> "something ncr merely human, or something super-human, was discovered at a very early time in parents and ancestors, particularly after they had departed this life. Their names were preserved...offerings such as *had* been presented to the gods of nature, were tended likewise to ancestral spirits."[173]

Thus, the general anthropomorphization of the gods was quickened by the secondary formation of ancestral gods, who were soon deemed worthy of worship, although these new gods were always distinguishable from the genuine, more ancient deities, because, as deified men, ancestors were generally treated as imperfect gods or demi-gods.[174] With this interpretation, Mueller believed he had cut the ground from under the feet of the anthropological theorists.[175] He was able to explain that the idea of a soul was formed for reasons somewhat analogous to those given by Tylor, Spencer and Lubbock, yet insisted that these ideas did not represent the germ of all religious consciousness.[176]

The third phase of religious evolution, that of Monotheism and Psychological Religion, was seen as a breakaway from the mythological. Not all religions managed to reach this stage, for again, the deciding factor in producing a new kind of religious consciousness such as Monotheism was language, and some languages, being too heavily mythicized, prevented the formation of metaphysical conceptions necessary for the belief in one God.[177] Mueller denied the traditional theory that the Hebrew religion was the one religion in the world which, by virtue of supernatural revelation, possessed a pure Monotheism from the very beginning.[178] He accepted the view of most contemporary scholars, including Stanley and Bunsen, that 'Jewish monotheism was preceded by a polytheism on the other side of the Flood and in Egypt',[179] and agreed that all monotheistic religions, (except Christianity), were derived from Polytheism, and ultimately as the Vedas indicated, from some form of Monotheism.[180] Not only that, he argued that Monotheism was already implicit in the early forms of all major non-Christian religions.

> "The Greeks," he pointed out, "even so early as the time of Homer began to suspect that, whatever the number and nature of the so-called gods might be, there must be something supreme...there must be at least one father of gods and man."[181]

And he quoted extracts from the *Rig-Veda* concerning Visvakarma, the maker of all things, to demonstrate that these were undeveloped expressions of 'the idea of *one* God'.[182] The presentation of these facts had a vital bearing on his comparative method, because not only did he separate three stages of religious consciousness and indicate the essential differences between Henotheism, Polytheism and Monotheism, but he viewed the three periods in terms of growth, of an unconscious but gradual progress towards a historical goal, thus pointing out some of the similarities in all religions which would make religious evolution possible. When considering the physical, the anthropological and the psychological stages, Mueller followed this straight-forward line of reasoning, maintaining that the three stages were distinguishable, but that the anthropological was implicit in the natural, and the psychological in the anthropological.[183]

Mueller defined Monotheism as 'a belief in one god, excluding the very possibility of other gods'.[184] Its appearance and acceptance, following great metaphysical achievement, could be due to a number of factors; the rejection of the old, unintelligible pantheon, as in the case of Socrates and the fourth century Greek philosophers, and the philosophers of the *Upanishads* in Indian religion;[185] the complete victory of one Deity over the others, as in the case of the Hebrew Jahweh;[186] or the complete collapse of Polytheism due to the interference of external cultural forces, as was illustrated by the breakdown of ancient Chinese 'heathendom' under the pressure of Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity.[187] Mueller held that Monotheism was possible when the infinite was understood spiritually and psychologically, rather than sensuously.

> "We find the earliest name for the Infinite, as discovered by man within himself, in the ancient *Upanishads*. There it is called *Atma*, the self, *Pratyag-atma*, the self-behind, looking towards *Paramatma*, the Highest self. Socrates knew the same self, but called it *Daimonion*, the indwelling God,"[188]

the Hebrews spoke of the spirit of God, and Christianity, which could be considered as an extension of the third stage of Judaism, called this Infinite by the name of the Holy Ghost.[189] This spiritualization of God was only implicit in the 'psychological mythology' of the polytheistic age of religion, in which the notions of 'breath, ghost, spirit, mind, soul, genius and many more names' figure more prominently in the religious attitude, created as they were by the personalization of the gods.[190] Thus the third period of religious consciousness, in contrast to the age of the disease of language and thought, brought progress, and those civilizations which were able to reach the stage of Monotheism made a permanent contribution to the whole course of history.[191] He cited an exception to this rule of progress—Buddhism, which he considered to be a form of nihilistic atheism.[192]

And where did Christianity fit into Mueller's 'religious map of the world'? In 1867 Mueller wrote his answer :

> "In order to understand fully the position of Christianity in the history of the world, and its true place among the

> religions of mankind, *we must compare it, not with Judaism only, but with the religious aspirations of the whole world*."[193]

He believed that all the historical religions of the world had 'unconsciously progressed' towards Christianity, that the concept of 'Heaven-Father' in the old Vedas foreshadowed the 'Our Father' of the Lord's Prayer;[194] that the anthropopathy of ancestor-worship and ancient mythology ultimately found its 'fullest expression and most perfect historical realization' in Christ, the Son of God;[195] that the 'Highest Self' of the *Upanishads* and Vedanta philosophy was truly fulfilled in the Christian Holy Ghost,

> "the spirit which unites all that is holy within man with the Holy of Holies, or the Infinite behind the veil of the Ego, or the merely phenomenal self."[196]

In short, Christianity was the supreme end of all religious aspirations, and more than that, it was the religion in which the highest metaphysical achievement of the Aryans and the pure Monotheism of the Jews were combined in the *Logos*, in the unfathomable Cause of all things, to whom the Greek Socrates, the Judaistic Philo and the writer of the fourth Gospel had offered the worthiest fruits of Man's thought.[197] It was the faith in which the Hebrew 'God of History' and the Aryan 'God of Nature' were married.[198] Christianity contained the Physical, the Anthropological, and the Psychological aspects of religion in the Trinity, which was created by the speculations of Alexandrian Gnosticism and could only be fully understood in terms of the *Logos*, the word made flesh in Christ.[199]

Although Mueller believed that Christianity came 'in the fullness of time—as the fulfilment of the hopes and desires of the whole world'[200]—he did not believe that the Christian religion of his own day could pretend to be as pure, and as powerful as that of the primitive Church. Christianity had undergone a decline, the Reformation had just managed to salvage its truth before the on coming of pending disaster.[201] It remained for the 'Religion of Christ'—

> "the Christianity of the first century in oll its dogmatic simplicity . . . with its over-powering love of God and man, that conquered the world"

—to be revived in the modern world.[202] Mueller considered that no disciple ever managed to emulate the ideals of his master;[203] many Buddhist Schools had turned Buddha's teachings into atheism, Catholicism had allowed error to triumph over the truth of Christ's commands.[204] But Mueller believed that the Religion of Christ could be resurrected, and when this was achieved the 'love of God towards all his creatures', no matter what their creed, would be reflected in the life of Man.[205]

> "By unduly depreciating all other religions, we have placed our own in a position which its founder never intended for it, we have torn it away from the sacred context of the history of the world."[206]

Soon the time of harvest would come

> "when the deepest foundations of all the religions of the world have been laid free and restored....Though leaving much behind of what is worshipped in Hindu temples, in Buddhist viharas, in Mohammedan mosques, in Jewish synagogues, and Christian churches, each believer may bring down with him into a quiet crypt what he values most—his own pearl of great price :
>
> The Hindu his innate disbelief in this world, his unhesitating belief in another world;
>
> The Buddhist his perception of an eternal law, his submission to it, his gentleness, his pity;
>
> The Mohammedan, if nothing else, at least his sobriety;
>
> The Jew his clinging, through good and evil days, to the One God, who loveth righteousness, and whose name is 'I am';
>
> The Christian, that which is better than all, if those who doubt would only try it—our love of God, call Him what you like, the infinite, the invisible, the immortal, the father, the highest self, above all, and through all, and in all—manifested in our love of man, our love of the living, our love of the dead, our living and undying love.
>
> The crypt, though as yet but small and dark, is visited even now by those few who shun the noise of many voices, the glare of many lights, the conflict of many opinions. Who knows but that in time it will grow wider and brighter and that the Crypt of the Past may become the Church of the Future."[207]

1. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, London, 1938, pp. 227f.

2. Here I foreshadow an article entitled 'Max Mueller as Missiologist', submitted to the periodical *Missiology*.

3. Metz, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

4. Allen, *Christianity op. cit.*, p. 79, where it is also written that Mueller's aim was 'not to formulate but to amass knowledge'.

5. See F. L. Cross (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Oxford, 1957, p. 880, sv. 'Max Mueller'.

6. Of the earlier writers Émile Durkheim stands as the fairest scholarly critic of Mueller, in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, (trans. J. W. Swain), London, 1915, pp. 71-87.

7. Eg., as background, O. von Boehtlingk, *F. Max Mueller als Mythendichter*, St. Petersburg, 1891; J. G. Frazer, *The Gorgon's Head and other literary pieces*, London, 1927, p. 379, cf. A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, London, 1910, pp. 141ff.

8. See Taylor, *Origin*, *op. cit.*, ch. 1; Benn, *Rationalism*, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 460.

9. Quoting from J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*, London, 1910, p. 20, cf. E. O. James, *Comparative Religion; an introductory and historical survey*, London, 1938, p. 12.

10. Eg. A. Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und Göttertransks*, Berlin, 1859; M. Bréal, *Hercule et Cacus ; étude de mythologie comparée*, Paris, 1863 ; Sir G. Cox, *The Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, London, 1870, cf. Stearns, *Prose*, *op. cit.*, pp. 288ff.

11. See *Vedic Hymns* (translated), in *SBE*, xxxii ; and *the Upanishads* (translated), in *SBE*, i and xv. Most of Mueller's techniques for dating language have been corroborated, see S. Piggott, *Prehistoric India*, Harmondsworth, 1950, pp. 253ff.

12. To cite the sub-title of Chaudhuri's biography.

13. See esp. R. K. Das Gupta, 'Max Mueller—the Humanist', in H. Rau (ed.), *Max Mueller*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-39.

14. Mueller wrote much about the evolution of religion and language, eg. *NR*, pp. 266ff.; *HL*, pp. 339ff., *et infra*.

15. *LLM*, i, 362 (letter to Argyll, 14th Jan., 1869).

16. *Ibid.*, i, p. 313 (to Gladstone, 12th Nov., 1865).

17. *HL*, p. 371.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

19. *NR.*, p. 576.

20. 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 895.

21. See *NR*, pp. 201ff., 214ff., 268ff. For Stanley, *ibid.*, pp. 270f., and Froude, *Auld*, pp. 84ff.

22. Mueller used the very good example of the so-called child-savage analogy, *NR*, pp. 200-05, 212ff., cf. G. W. Trompf, 'The Origin of the Comparative Study of Religion' (Monash University Masters Thesis), Melbourne, 1965, ch. 4.

23. *Auld*, p. 173.

24. Terms used by Metz, *op. cit.*, pt. 1, ch. 3; pt. 2, ch. 1.

25. *HL*, p. 46.

26. 'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason', in *Last Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

27. *HL*, pp. 46f.

28. Kant denied that supersensuous objects could be the objects of theoretical knowledge. In going beyond Kant at this point, Mueller's position is reminiscent of Lotze's *Mikrokosmus* (cf. *ibid.*, and 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, pp. 891-93.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 892.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 892f.

31. *Ibid.*, p, 895.

32. *HL*, p. 40.

33. *Auld*, p. 173; *Chips*, iv, pp. 437f.

34. *HL*, p. 185.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 185ff.

36. *Chips,* iv, p. 471. This could be misleading; Mueller did not speculate about *the* original language, but the earliest language about which scholarship has evidence.
37. See *ibid.*, p. 471 (iv).
38. *Ibid.*, p. 470. Cf. also his *Ueber die Resultate der Sprachwissenschaft*; *Vorlesung gehalten in der kaiserlichen Universität zu Strassburg*, Strassburg, 1872, esp. p. 28.
39. 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, pp. 893f.
40. Esp. *Chips,* ii, pp. 6-9; *ST*, pp. 216f., *PsR*, ch. 12, pp. 361ff.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6, cf. *Chips*, ii, pp. 6f.
42. *HL*, p. 32.
43. Eg., Spencer, *First Principles, op. cit.*, sect. 123 (p. 312), cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 71f.
44. In *LLM*, i, p. 476 (letter dated 7th Jan., 1875).
45. *Ibid.*, i, pp. 481f. (4th Feb., 1875).
46. *Auld*, p. 173.
47. See esp. *ibid.*, pp. 172f., 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 895.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 894, 895; and for a discussion of the identification of the natural and the rational in Mueller, see Voigt, *Mueller, op. cit.*, pp. 19ff.
49. *LLM*, i, p. 481 (to Argyll, 4th Feb., 1875).
50. *Ibid.*
51. 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 894.
52. See B. Croce, *Theory and History of Historiography* (trans. D. Ainslie), London, 1921, esp. p. 12; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford, p. 219, cf. p. 293 (and for his treatment of Hegel, pp. 115ff.).
53. 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 894, cf. p. 895.
54. Cf. Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
55. *Auld*, pp. 84f.
56. For comments on Mueller's epistemology, esp. Stearns, *Prose, op. cit.*, p. 299; Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 79; Voigt, *op. cit.*, ch. 1.
57. *Chips*, ii, p. 6.
58. *Auld*, p. 86.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 84f. Cf. Froude, *Short Studies, op. cit.*, i, ch. 1, on the so-called 'science of history'; and on Mueller's sympathy for Froude's and Kingsley's approaches to history, *Auld*, pp. 88, 90; *Chips*, ii, pp. 6-9.
60. See *PsR*, p. 2, where Mueller argued that history was not just a 'mechanical development' but 'an unbroken continuity,' a 'constant ascent, or an *eternal purpose*'.
61. Froude, *op. cit.*, i, p. 38.
62. 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 893 for *Nous*; cf. *Chips*, ii, pp. 6ff.
63. See *PsR*, pp. xvi, 1-8, 538f.
64. *NR*, p. 269.
65. *Chips*, iv, pp. 460f., cf. Lotze's *Mikrokosmus*, see *supra*, ch. 1. In this way 'evolution steals the question'; Stearns, *op. cit.*, p. 306.
66. See *NR*, pp. 194-220; 'Why I am an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 895.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 893.
68. *Contributions*, i, p. 155.
69. *LLM*, i, p. 262 (Letter to his wife, 19th April, 1862).
70. Eg., on Darwin, *NR*, p. 273.
71. *Chips*, iv, p. 343, and cf. M. Ginsberg, *Evolution and Progress*, London, 1961 p. 195.
72. *Introduction*, p. 7.
73. See Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
74. See Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 71; James, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Cf. F. Bopp, *Comparative Grammar, op. cit.*, 3 vols.; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie* (ed. B. von E. H. Meyer), Basel, 1953 edn., 3 vols.
75. *Op. cit.*, p. 71. (It is doubtful whether any group of scholars has ever accepted such a view !)
76. See *Chips*, ii, pp. 18f., and with the same applying to the Turanian and Semitic linguistic families, *Introduction*, pp. 108f. For a discussion of Mueller's

views of *Ursprache*, Voigt, *op. cit.*, p. 5, and for background in Eugène Burnouf and Baron d'Eckstein, see *supra*, ch. 1.

77. See *Introduction*, p. 106 and n. 1; *Biographies of Words and the Home of the Aryas*, London, 1887, chs. 5-7.

78. *Introduction*, p. 103.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

80. *HL*, p. 144.

81. Is this exaggerated? Cf. Durkheim. *op. cit.*, p. 71; Piggott, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-56.

82. *Introduction*, pp. 106f.

83. *HL*, p. 22.

84. *NR*, p. 114, cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religion*, Oxford, 1965, p. 21.

85. *HL*, pp. 143f.

86. Cf. *AR*, pp. 94, 336 on the apparent inevitability of man's belief in God.

87. *Chips*, ii, p. 6.

88. Quoted by J. M. Kitagawa, in his preface to J. Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, New York, 1958, p. xvi.

89. See *supra*, ch. 1, and for further comments on profane history, *Chips*. i, p. xxviii.

90. *HL*, p. 132; also quoted in Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

91. *HL*, p. 127.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 120ff.

94. About fetishism he said: 'I am fully aware that, after a long series of intermediate steps, such contradictions arise in the human mind, but they cannot spring up suddenly' (*Ibid.*, p. 126).

95. *Chips*, ii, p. 8. My italics.

96. See J. M. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

97. *HL*, p. 373.

98. Cf. *PsR*, p. vi on the 'divine drama' of history.

99. *Introduction*, pp. 13f. Note how this passage is out of tune with much Indian philosophy, cf. eg. Sankara, discussed by H. Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (ed. J. Campbell), New York, 1956, pt. III, iv, 4. Sankara asked for pardon for having described He who was Ineffable.

100. *Introduction*, pp. 15f. My italics.

101. Cf. esp. N. Sangiacomo, *L'Infinito di Max-Mueller*, Catania, 1882, *passim*; and see also Mueller, *Introduction* (1882 edn. only), p. 10, n. 1.

102. *HL*, p. 23 (in 1878).

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 23f.

104. *Ibid*, p. 26.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 32. My italics.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

109. See A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religon*, London, 1899 edn., ii, p. 346. Cf. Mueller's 'The Dawn of Reason in Religion', in J. Samuelson (ed.), *The Civilization of our Day*, London, 1896.

110. Lang, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 345f. It is true that Spencer did not believe in *unqualified* progress, and Mueller recognized this (in *HL*, pp. 65f.), but Spencer had treated *religion* as something which had not undergone retrogressive stages, and Mueller could not agree.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

113. *Ibid.*, pp. 53f., cf. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891.

114. See *supra*, ch. 1, cf. I. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp.2f.

115. See *SL*, i, pp. 211f.

116. *Ibid.*

117. *SL*, i, pp. 211f. (1st Ser., 1861 edn. only).

118. *Chips*, i, p. xx.

119. *Science, op. cit.*, p. 196.

120. Cf. J. A. de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races* (trans. A. Collins), New York, 1915, pp. 122, 206-08; E. Renan, *Studies of Religious History* (Authorized Trans.), London, 1893, pp. 4, 62 71, 115f. Despite Mueller's continuing, friendly correspondence with Renan, he certainly was not, by comparison, a thorough-going Aryanist.

121. See 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 892.

122. *PsR*, p. 52, cf. Émile Burnouf, *op., cit* pp. 77ff, and ch. 1 *supra*.

123. See *Chips*, i, pp. xxixff.; *SE*, i, pp. 21ff. Cf. Renan, *Vie, op. cit.*, esp. pp. 249ff.; L. F. Mott, *Ernest Renan*, London, 1921, p. 220, and on Bunsen's views see G. W. B. Russell (ed.), *Letters of Matthew Arnold*, New York, 1895, p. 381.

124. From Stanley's preface to Bunsen, *God in History, op. cit.*, i, p. x.

125. See *PsR.*, pp. 62f. cf. p. 408.

126. Eg. *HL*, esp. p. 378.

127. *Introduction*, p. 144. My italics. Cf. also *Chips*, i, pp. 341ff.

128. This demonstrates Mueller's independence from Émile Burnouf's views.

129. Synonymous with Hindu?

130. *Chips*, iv, p. 252. My italics.

131. *Ibid.*

132. See *PsR*, pp. 74f., cf. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; *Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, London, 1894.

133. *NR*, pp. 572ff.; *PR*, pp. 5ff.; *AR*, pp. 115f.; *PsR*, p. 91. Cf. also Metz, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

134. *HL*, p. 376; *AR*, p. 76.

135. Thought and language are inseparable according to Mueller (*ibid.*, p. 64); but philosophies and religions are *constructed* out of language (*PsR*, pp. 71f.).

136. *Chips*, ii, p. 9; *AR*, p. 186.

137. *Chips*, ii, p. 9;

138. *HL*, p. 151; *Introduction*, p. 1. For a briefer analysis of this and subsequent stages, see R. N. Dandekar, 'Max Mueller—Comparative Religion and Mythology', in Rau (ed.), *Max Mueller, op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

139. Mueller conjectured a phrase *Dyu Patar, HL*, p. 216.

140. *Chips*, ii, pp. 9f.

141. *HL*, p. 286.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

143. *Ancient Sanskrit Literature, op. cit.*, p. 532, cf. *HL*, p. 271.

144. See *ibid.*, pp. 206, 211f., 260f., 290, cf. p. 364.

145. *Ibid.*, pp. 216f. Mueller believed that much could be learned from this tolerance (p. 364).

146. *Ibid.*, pp. 143ff., 212.

147. Eg., Sir C. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, London, 1921, i, pp. 100-02.

148. *HL*, p. 289, cf. *Contributions*, i, pp. 138-41. On the emergence of pantheons in Indian religion, *HL*, pp. 212f.

149. See *NR*, p. 138; *HL*, ch. 2; *Contributions*, i, pp. 150, 202; *AR*, pp. 350ff.

150. *PR*, pp. 119f.

151. See Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

152. See *HL*, p. 182.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

154. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 286 for the quotation, and on China, *Introduction*, esp. p. 130. Cf. P. le P. Renouf, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt* (*Hibbert Lectures 1879*), London, 1880, pp. 217ff.

156. *HL*, esp. pp. 362-76.

157. *Chips*, ii, p. 10.(The 'Mythological Age' is not a phrase invented by Mueller.)

158. To use Durkheim's terms, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

159. See *Contributions*, i, pp. 68ff.; *HL*, p. 192, 212f.

160. *Contributions*, i, p. 69.

161. The quotation is from *Chips*, ii, p. 146. Durkheim misunderstood Mueller to have made a complete separation between mythology and religion (*op. cit.*, pp. 81f., yet cf. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 17).

162. The quotation is from *Contributions*, i, p.284; and for the Vedas, *HL*, p. 214; *NR*, p. 574; *PR*, pp. 10f.

163. *Contributions*, i, p. 285. Questions of the origin of mythology are in large part beyond the scope of this book. For Mueller's solar myth theory, see *ibid.*, i, esp. p. 155, cf. Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

164. *Contributions*, *passim*.

165. See *HL*, p. 213, *Contributions*, ii, pp. 474ff.

166. *HL*, p. 271.

167. See Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 81f. paraphrasing *SL*, ii, pp. 456ff.; cf. *PR* pp.276ff.

168. *Introduction*, p. 33.

169. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

170. *NR*, p. 575.

171. *AR*, esp. ch. 5.

172. See *ibid.*, pp. 117ff., cf. Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 17f.; James, *op. cit.*, pp. 11f.

173. *NR*, p. 575 (my italics), cf. *AR*, p. 116.

174. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

175. For comments on Spencer, for example, see *Ibid.*, p. 142; *Contributions*, i. p. 150, cf. Trompf, 'Origin', *op. cit.*, ch. 8; and for Mueller's very sensitive approach to so-called savages or primitives, see his 'The Savage', in *The Nineteenth Century*, XVII, 1885, pp. 109ff. (partly reproduced in W. H. Capps (ed.), *Ways of Understanding Religion*, New York, 1972, pp. 70ff.).

176. See *AR*, pp. 128-30, cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

177. See *AR*, pp. 117ff. for religions still at the Anthropological stage.

178. See *HL*, pp. 254ff., and for background, White, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 203, 379, and ch. 17.

179. Cf. *HL*, p. 130.

180. See *HL*, pp. 129-31, etc.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

182. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

183. *NR*, pp. 574-77.

184. *HL*, p. 376.

185. *Chips*, ii, pp. 1-3 ; *HL*, p. 139.

186. *Introduction*, pp. 119ff.

187. See *ibid.*, esp. p. 130.

188. *NR*, p. 576.

189. See *PsR*, p. 368 on Judaism; *NR*, p. 577 on Christianity.

190. *Ibid.*, p. 576.

191. *AR*, p. 76; *PR*, p. 328.

192. See *HL*, p. 305, though he did not consider Buddha himself an atheist.

193. *Chips*, i, p. xxviii.

194. *HL*, pp. 216f.; *NR* p. 574.

195. Quotation fr. *ibid.*, p. 575, cf. *AR*, pp. 378ff.

196. Quotation fr. *NR*, p. 577, cf. *AutoFrag*, pp. 41-43.

197. See 'Why I am not an Agnostic', *loc. cit.*, p. 895; *Auld*, p. 116; *PsR*, pp. 374ff., 399ff.

198. *Introduction*, pp. 92f., 148, though whereas Mueller affirmed a direct historical connection between Judaism and Christianity, he denied anything but a connection of underlying religious consciousness between Christianity and the Aryan religions of the East (cf. his *India, what can it teach us*? London, 1883, p. 279, cf. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 290, and for background in Eckstein, Stunkel, 'India, etc.', *loc. cit.*, p. 231).

199. *Auld*, p. 116.

200. *Introduction*, pp. 148f.

201. For Mueller's attitude to the Reformation, see *supra*, ch. 2.

202. *Chips*, i, p. xxvi.

203. *Ibid*, p. xxv.
204. *HL*, p. 305 on Buddhism, and *Chips*, ii, esp. p. 27 on Christianity.
205. *Introduction*, p. 149.
206. *Ibid*., p. 148.
207. *HL*, pp. 377f.

POSTSCRIPT

I will conclude by writing something more specific about Max Mueller's relations with Indians and India. This subject has not formed the centre of my attention because, for one thing, the relevant evidence and issues have been ably discussed by other scholars.[1] Besides, it will be up to Indians (and Chaudhuri may have already set the tone) to estimate the importance of 'the revered pandit' in their own way. It is worth observing, however, that the aforegoing pages may correct certain false impressions about the man's attitudes towards Indian culture.

I have cited enough statements to show that Mueller was by no means a 'convert' to (Vedanta) 'Hinduism'. My friend Johannes Voigt has tried to argue that, toward the very end of his life at least, the great scholar underwent a change of heart. He is supposed to have eventually concurred with Arthur Schopenhauer's glowing praise of the *Upanishads* and to have died as the architect of a special faith that blended Vedanta philosophy with his own unorthodox brand of liberal Christianity.[2] My own estimate of the situation, however, is rather different. Mueller's Christianity was unorthodox only by very narrow standards, and he was concerned to remain firmly within that religious tradition until his end. In one of his last letters, written to his Indian friend P. C. Mozoomdar, who was a more liberal adherent of Brahmo Samaj, he spent time confirming his own devoted membership of the English Church (the Protestant Communion it had been natural for him to transfer to as a Lutheran immigrant in England).[3] He went on to write more as a missiologist than as a syncretist; he hoped that, one day, all men would know the truth, insisting that Indians should accept it in their own way. Although he hardly denied that truth had already presented itself time and again in Indian religious experience, and although he considered Christian denominationalism irrelevant to India, it is plain that for him the supreme truth rests in the Religion of Christ.[4] Thus when Mueller imagined a religious shift of the future, which only needs a quiet crypt (or 'the unnecessary temple', as another has put it),[5] he also considered that the Christian offering to this future is 'better than all, if those who doubt will only try it'. It is not conceived as a new faith, a Bahai-like blending of all the major religions' tenets and rituals, but a freeing restoration of 'the deepest foundations' of these faiths, to provide the basis of a cross-cultural, profoundly Christian 'Church' emerging in the still more distant future. Thus Mueller was not only anticipating further, fruitful dialogue between peoples of divergent persuasion, but a rich interchange of thought and spirituality which would ultimately produce different cultural expressions of the one great faith. There would be 'oriental Christianity', not just its western forms,[6] yet the one faith permeating through all.

I state Mueller's position this way because I seek to represent his views accurately. I do not consider this the place to defend him or to decide whether his approach is worth adopting. Certainly, though, he must be redeemed from the charge of wishing to undermine Indian culture, let alone that of being a Christian heretic. Mueller never lost his admiration for India's spirituality, nor his impulse to translate and expound its holy testaments. It is misleading to claim that he eventually turned to the *Upanishads* as the same 'solace of life' cherished by Schopenhauer, when he had always approached these venerable texts with awe, treating them—whether correctly or otherwise— as 'the most important portion of the Vedas'.[7] His approach to Indian thought, however, must be understood in its twofold aspect. The gems of the Indian past were not to be confused with the realities of the present. What Mueller found in the Vedas were insights on which Aryan religious life had been built historically, yet also on which all religion should be founded theologically. Contemporary Brahmanism, however, while handled with relative sensitivity as an observable historical phenomenon, was treated unenthusiastically as an expression of spiritual truth.[8] Not dissimilarly, the Christ of the Gospels was lauded as the event to which all that was great in man's religion moved though ancient history, whereas the petty denominationalisms of nineteenth century Christianity had somehow betrayed Jesus. One of the key reasons why Mueller struggled with the ancient wisdom of the East was to reveal the importance of spiritual foundations; by reappropriating what is best and deepest in the past, one lays new bases for the future enlivening of the human spirit. Yet for Indians to return to the original insights of the Vedas was already a stepping-stone towards the supreme revelation of God in Christ; while for Europeans to understand India's contribution to the world would involve the realization that it was pointless to impose a narrow, dogmatic mission faith on a people who had so much gold to mine from their own heritage. Through historical study, then, science and faith ultimately merged and provided a fresh, forward-looking perspective for modern man.

For all his religious sensibility, Mueller was a man of science. The interrelating of the spiritual and the scientific will not come as something new to the modern Indian, though it presents problems to the more secularized minds of the West. Mueller's science, however, was not that of the *gurava* but of German *Socialwissenschaft*. Despite his own personal conclusions, he recognized that the comparative study of religions becomes a spurious exercise if the parity of all religion is not admitted, or if one maintains an unfair predeliction for one set of beliefs as against another.[9] Whether we believe Mueller was successful in steering between the Charybdis of objectification and the Scylla of his personal commitments, there is every justification for claiming him as the founder of the modern study of comparative religion. This is a scholarly pursuit which will remain in the world of learning for many years to come, and which will provide an intellectual forum in which thinkers from all over the world may continue to voice their insights, and to further understanding between men. In the present world situation, given the small pockets of Asian people around the world, the appeal of Indian wisdom to young Americans, the confrontation between *homo religiosus* and Marxism, and the communications revolution of the last half century, the continuance of dialogue between the world religions is both necessary and welcome.

Mueller, I should reiterate, cannot be said to have founded comparative religion alone. This study says much about other scholars' contributions to his work, and besides, I have argued before that his achievement should be placed alongside the first great English sociologist of religion, Herbert Spencer. Spencer was not only concerned with those religions which could be documented historically. Even if he may have drawn false inferences from them—with his evolutionary presuppositions—he was fascinated by so-called primitive religions as well.[10] These primal belief-systems, thousands in number, should not be denied the opportunity to voice their positions. Some of these primal religions have survived in Southern Asia to this day—albeit in pockets—and it is unfair to write them off as having spoiled rather than enriched the glories of India. Not that Spencer paid these smaller traditions (such as that of the Veddas) any compliments.[11] But Mueller gave them virtually no attention at all.

From these two men, in fact, two rather divergent approaches to the comparative study of religion have arisen. There are now two fairly distinct traditions of western scholarship, one more historically-oriented and one more anthropological. Spencer's expansive evolutionism provided inspiration for such scholars as Sir James Frazer (of *Golden Bough* fame), R. R. Marrett, Bronislaw Malinowski, Paul Radin and the like. Mueller, on the other hand, gave an impetus to neo-Hegelian philosophies of religion at the end of the nineteenth century, to Wilhelm Schmidt's famous attempts to uncover the primal revelation, and eventually to that modern scholarship which concentrates on comparative studies of the great world religions. Today some may assert that it is the anthropological tradition which has contributed most to our understanding of religion as a global phenomenon. While there is much truth in this, one needs to be shocked into realizing how perniciously racist so much of nineteenth century anthropology actually was, with the lines of demarcation it drew between 'civilized' European, 'semi-civilized Hindoos' and the 'lowest types of races'.[12] One of the great achievements of Max Mueller was that he not only saw how the history of Indian or Eastern spirituality could put the shallow side of western culture to shame, but in the final analysis denied so-called 'savagery' to any culture whatsoever.[13] The sensitive Mueller and his tradition will be increasingly appreciated for this as time goes on.

As a final word, I should comment briefly on what Mueller can teach twentieth century theologians and spiritual teachers. It has been a longstanding worry of mine that systematic theology or scientific spirituality in both West and East have been too often argued out from first principles and not based on an accurate awareness of the varieties of religious experience around the world. In other words, the theological systems of European Christians and Indian spirituals, when viewed from a cross-cultural perspective, look awfully parochial. I mean this statement to apply to thinkers as far apart as Paul Tillich, with his sophisticated system of philosophical categorization, and the long imprisoned *guru* Shri Anandamūrti, whose elaborate and difficult texts on yoga have been acclaimed as a universal 'cult of spirituality'. Max Mueller, I maintain, despite the problems and *a priori* tendencies in his own thought, still calls us to *compare*. Any systematic statements of belief are to that extent impoverished if they show no awareness of alternative perspectives or of the extraordinary riches of mankind's religious life. To their credit, I must note, some western scholars have already perceived this; they have refused to expound Biblical theology, for example, without first examining the ancient Middle Eastern and Mediterranean religious scene as a whole.[14] It is in doing such necessary groundwork that we lay out a solid foundation for our own personal or community views, which may be defined over and against those alternatives we should have struggled—as fairly and as honestly as possible—to comprehend.

1. Eg. cf., Various articles in H. Rau (ed.), *Max Mueller, op. cit.*
2. Voigt, *Mueller, op. cit.*, esp. pp. 32-34.
3. *LLM*, ii, pp. 391f. Mueller became an Anglican from 1851.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
5. Cf. V. van Nuffel, *The Mystery of the Temple*, Port Moresby, 1976, pp. 104ff.
6. *LLM*, ii. p. 393.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 233 (letter to B. M. Malabari, 24th Oct., 1888), and see i. p. 471, cf. 'Introduction', *SBE*, i, pp. lviiff.
8. See esp. *Chips*, iv, pp. 318ff.
9. Esp. *Introduction*, p. 207, cf. Voigt, *op. cit.*, pp. 15f.
10. H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1873 edn., i, *passim*.
11. Eg., Spencer, *Descriptive Sociology*, London, 1874, div. 1, pt. 1A, table III.
12. I allude here to the sub-titles of *ibid* (the work on later volumes being partly completed by D. Duncan).
13. 'The Savage', *loc. cit.*, pp. 109ff.
14. Eg. W. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament* (trans. J. A. Baker), London, 1960-1967, 2 vols., G. von Rad, *Old Testament Theology* (trans. J. Stalker), Edinburgh, 1962-1965, 2 vols.

BIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER

Arnold, Matthew (1822-1888). English poet and literary critic. An Inspector of Schools (1851-86) and Professor of Poetry at Oxford (1857-67). He was the son of Thomas Arnold, the famous Headmaster of Ruby School.

Bauer, Bruno (1809-1882). German liberal critic of the Bible.

Bopp, Franz (1791-1867). German philologist, and acclaimed as the founder of the science of comparative philology.

Brockhaus, Hermann (1806-1877). German Orientalist; Professor of Indology at Leipzig from 1848.

Brosses, Charles de (1709-1777). A French scholar; he was the first to employ the geographical divisions Australia and Polynesia in scholarly writing.

Bunsen, Chevalier Christian K. J. von (1791-1860). Prussian diplomat, lay theologian and scholar. He was Prussian ambassador in London from 1841 to 1854.

Burnouf, Émile Louis (1821-1907). A French Orientalist and Sanskritist.

Burnouf, Eugène (1801-1852). A French Orientalist most famous for his researches into the Zend language. He was a relative of Émile.

Butler, Joseph (1692-1752). A famous English theologian and philosopher, his most famous work being *The Analogy of Religion*. He was an Anglican bishop from 1738.

Carlyle, Thomas (1795-1881). Scottish essayist and historian. A man of great learning who was influenced by Goethe's writings, and who produced such monumental works as *Past and Present* and *Heroes and Hero Worship*.

Clough, Arthur Hugh (1819-1861). English poet; a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford (1841-48), he resigned his post because of scepticism.

Colenso, John William (1814-1883). Anglican bishop of Natal. He researched into the Zulu language, and is most famous for denying the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of the Bible.

Comte, I. Auguste M. F. (1798-1857). French mathematician and philosopher. He was the founder of Positivism and the cult of the worship of humanity; and he is acclaimed as the father of Sociology.

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809-1882). The renowned naturalist and author of *The Origin of Species* (1859).

Drobisch, Moritz Wilhelm (1802-1896). German mathematician and philosopher; Professor at Leipzig.

Eckstein, Baron Ferdinand d' (1789-1861). Orientalist, occultist and mystic; he edited the neo-Catholic periodical *Le Catholique* in Paris from 1826.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1803-1882). A very famous American essayist and poet. His best known work is probably *English Traits*.

Froude, James Anthony (1818-1894). English historian, and the biographer of Thomas Carlyle.

Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898). Four times Prime Minister of Great Britain, and a classical scholar in his own right.

Gobineau, J. A. de (1818-1882). French diplomat, Orientalist and writer, his most famous work being *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749-1832). Outstanding German poet, dramatist and humanist. The author of *Faust*.

Goldstücker, Theodor (1821-1872). A German-born Sanskrit scholar who worked in England from 1850.

Grimm, Jacob (1785-1863). A great philologist and mythologist, together with his brother Wilhelm, Jacob wrote an important German grammar and collected German folk tales.

Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich (1834-1919). German biologist and philosopher; the first German advocate of organic evolution.

Hare, Julius Charles (1795-1855). The English Archdeacon of Lewes, and co-author (with his brother) of an important work called *Guesses at Truth*.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831). A highly influential German philosopher, and Professor at Berlin from 1818 to 1831. His background importance for Marxism is very widely known.

Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776-1841). German philosopher and educator; best known for work on educational psychology.

Herder, Johann Gottfried von (1744-1803). A renowned German man of letters; he is best known for his writings on the philosophy of history.

Hodgson, Brian Houghton (1800-1894). A British Orientalist and a civil servant in India; he pioneered the modern scholarly study of Buddhism.

Humboldt, Baron Alexander von (1769-1859). German naturalist and explorer, he was one of the founding fathers of Geography.

Humboldt, Baron Wilhelm von (1767-1835). Important as a dilpomat, advocate of universities, political theorist and philologist. He was the brother of Alexander.

Huxley, Thomas Henry (1825-1895). An English biologist, well known for his defence of Darwin's theory of evolution.

Jowett, Benjamin (1817-1893). English Greek scholar and liberal theologian. He was Vice Chancellor of Oxford University, 1882-86.

Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804). The outstanding German metaphysician and transcendental philosopher; his work has had a permanent influence on modern European philosophy.

Keble, John (1792-1866). English clergyman and poet, and initiator of the Oxford Movement to revive Catholic doctrine within the Church of England.

Kingsley, Charles (1819-1875). English clergyman and novelist. He was author of the famed *Water Babies*.

Leibnitz, Baron Gottfried Wilhelni von (1646-1716). German philosopher, mathematician and theologian. Among other things he defended *monads* as the ultimate constituents of the material universe, and sought ways of integrating Catholic and Protestant doctrines.

Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim (1729-1781). Great German dramatist and literary critic. His work *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* laid the foundations of German Protestant liberal theology.

Liebmann, Otto (1840-1912). German philosopher.

Lotze, Rudolph Hermann (1817-1881). German philosopher and exponent of *Ideal-Realismus*. He was also one of the founders of physiological Psychology.

Lubbock, Sir John, 1st Baron Avebury (1834-1913). English naturalist and early prehistorian.

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, 1st Baron Macaulay (1800-1859). English statesman and historian. He is known for his reforms of the British government of India, and his *History of England*.

Marx, Karl (1818-1883). German political philosopher and ubiquitously recognized as the father of modern Communism.

Maurice, Frederick Denison (1805-1872). English theologian and the chief founder of the movement known as Christian Socialism.

Mill, James (1773-1836). Scottish philosopher, historian and economist working in England. He was a promulgator of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian philosophy.

Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873). English philosopher and political economist. Part of his life was devoted to the administration of India, and he is widely recognized for his essay *On Liberty*.

Neander, Johann August Wihelm (1789-1850). German Protestant church historian and theologian; Professor of Church History at Berlin from 1813.

Newman, John Henry (1801-1890). English theologian and one of the leaders of the Oxford Movement (see under Keble). He became a Roman Catholic in 1845 and was later consecrated a Cardinal.

Palgrave, Francis Turner (1824-1897). English poet and critic; the celebrated anthologist of *The Golden Treasury*.

Pusey, Edward Bouverie (1800-1882). English Anglican theolgian and one of the founders of the Oxford Movement (see under Keble).

Renan, Ernest (1823-1890). French philologist and historian; a leader of the school of critical philosophy in his country.

Rosen, Friedrich (1805-1837). A German Sanskritist.

Rueckert, Friedrich (1788-1866). German poet, translator and Professor of Oriental Languages (at Berlin from 1841).

Saint-Hilaire, Jules Barthélemy (1805-1895). French journalist, savant and politician.

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775-1854). German philosopher and theorist of religion.

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von (1759-1805). German poet and playwright, and regarded as second only to Goethe in the field of German literature.

Schlegel, August Wilhelm von (1767-1845). German man of letters and editor of Sanskrit works.

Schlegel, Friedrich (1772-1829). Brother of August, and author of an important *Philosophie der Geschichte*.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich E. D. (1768-1834). German Protestant liberal theologian and philosopher. The Professor of Theology at Berlin, 1810-34.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860). German pessimist philosopher, and one who researched into Oriental literature.

Sewell, William (1804-1874). English divine and author of miscellaneous writings.

Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903). English philosopher, naturalist, political economist and founding father of social science. He may be said to have been the first great Social Darwinist.

Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn (1815-1881). Broad Church Anglican divine and historian. He was Dean of Westminster Abbey from 1864.

Strauss, David Friedrich (1808-1874). Liberal German theologian and author of the well-known *Leben Jesu*.

Thierry, Augustin (1795-1856). Celebrated French historian.

Tylor, Edward Burnett (1832-1917). English anthropologist and the first Professor in Anthropology at Oxford (1896-1909).

Tyndall, John (1820-1893). British physicist and popularizer of evolutionism.

Wedgwood, Hensleigh (1803-1891). English mathematician and etymologist.

Weisse, Christian Hermann (1801-1866). An Hegelian Professor of Philosophy at Leipzig, though opposed to Hegel's pantheism.

Williams, Sir Monier Monier- (1819-1899). English Sanskritist and Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford from 1860. He was born in Bombay, and is author of the best known Sanskrit-English dictionary.

Williams, Rowland (1817-1870). Welsh divine and critical Hebrew scholar. Criticized for his part in *Essays and Reviews*, 1860.

Wilson, Henry Bristow (1803-1888). English divine; as with Williams, he was criticized for his part in *Essays and Reviews*.

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